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1 Introduction
Economics tends to gravitate toward the assumption that costs—be they economic,
effort or cognitive—are convex. One rationale for this assumption is that it makes theoret-
ical models analytically tractable. Another rationale is that it seems intuitively plausible.
However, such intuition has proved fragile following a number of recent experiments suggest-
ing that, when it comes to decision making on moral or ethical issues, individuals perceive
a concave cost of deviating from what they believe is right (Kajackaite and Gneezy 2015;
Abeler et al. 2016; Gino et al. 2010; Hurkens and Kartik 2009).1 That is, individuals are
perfectionist when it comes to morals or ideology as they do not distinguish much between
small and large deviations from their bliss points. This has also been argued by Osborne
(1995) to be realistic in ideological settings. Whether individuals perceive costs to be convex
or concave has far-reaching implications for the behavior we should expect of them and,
as such, it goes to the heart of the empirical predictions theoretical models provide. For
instance, individuals with concave moral costs will tend to give up on their morals if they
cannot follow them fully. This pattern of behavior has been popularly labeled the “what-
the-hell-effect” (Ariely 2012; Baumeister and Heatherton 1996). Theoretically, the concavity
of costs associated with deviations from a moral or political bliss point also affects related
phenomena: Polarization in society (Kamada and Kojima 2014); optimal policy when the
policy space is multi-dimensional (Eguia 2013); the sustainability of biased norms (Michaeli
and Spiro in press); and whether effort to achieve high status falls when a person’s relative
status falls (Clark and Oswald 1998).
The question remains whether concave preferences have empirically observable im-
plications for important real-world decision situations. Showing that they do is the purpose
1Recent experimental results suggest that the intrinsic cost of lying is fixed (hence concave). Kajackaite and
Gneezy (2015) show that once the incentives to lie are higher than the cost, subjects switch from telling
the truth to lying to the full extent. The results of Abeler et al. (2016) are similar. Earlier research has also
been suggestive of a concave cost of lying: The decision whether to lie is often insensitive to the outcome of
lying once it is preferred over the outcome of being truthful (Hurkens and Kartik 2009) and so a maximal
deviation from the truth will often be chosen by those deciding to lie (Gneezy et al. 2013). Likewise, using
a dynamic setting, Gino et al. (2010) showed that once individuals are induced to cheat, they succumb to
full-blown cheating. When it comes to deviations from one’s ideological bliss point, Kendall et al. (2015)
have shown by structural estimation that voters are most likely to have a concave cost of deviating from
their ideological bliss point. See Merlo and De Paula (in press) for recent work on structural estimation of
voter ideology.
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of this paper. The setting we are interested in is one where a person interacts with peers
who are ideologically distant from her when making decisions about ideologically contentious
issues. How individuals behave in such a setting remains an empirically open question due
to unobservability of individual ideology and due to endogeneity of the choice of whom to
interact with. These two problems are resolved at the U.S. Courts of Appeals (U.S. Federal
Circuit Courts): There exist commonly used and robust predictors for individual ideology,
and assignment of whom an individual interacts with is random.2 For each judicial case, a
panel of three randomly assigned judges needs to decide on a verdict (affirming or overturn-
ing the lower court verdict) and to compose an “opinion” (i.e., a text) motivating the verdict.
The opinion often serves as precedent for future cases and as such affects both society and
policy. Furthermore, being a text rather than a binary element, the opinion can reflect the
assertiveness of the panel and its ideological composition. It is well documented that ideol-
ogy plays an important role in deciding the opinion (Sunstein et al. 2006; Berdejó and Chen
2014). Roughly speaking, the way by which an individual judge’s action can affect outcomes
is twofold: 1) the judge may have a direct effect on the verdict and opinion; and 2) if the
judge does not manage to directly affect them, she may write a minority opinion (dissent or
concur).3 In this setting, using a rich set of evidence, we document a puzzling phenomenon
that boils down to the following: while most judges have a clear ideological component in
their actions, the judges with the most extreme ideology “cave in”—despite not affecting the
ideological color of the opinion, they do not speak out (dissent or concur) against it. A more
detailed account now follows (the full details appear in the next section).
2Several recent papers employ random assignment of judges (e.g., Aizer and Doyle 2015; Shayo and Zussman
2011; Kling 2006; Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen 2011).
3Dissenting means stating a disagreement with both the verdict and the opinion. Concurring is a milder form
of disagreement that is used by a judge who agrees with the verdict but disagrees with the motivation, i.e.,
disagrees with the opinion. See further details in Section 2.1.
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Figure 1.— Dissent and Ideology Score Relative to Panel Median – raw data
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Notes: x-axis: Ideology score of a judge demeaned by the median of the panel of judges assigned on the
case. The x-axis is divided into 15 evenly-spaced bins (the number denotes the midpoint of the bin) from
left-to-right in ideology space, where relatively more conservative scores are along the right on the x-axis.
y-axis: Proportion of dissents over all votes in each bin. The dashed lines depict the 95% confidence
interval. Data on cases comes from OpenJurist (1950-2007). Ideology scores come from the Judicial
Common Space database.
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Figure 2.— Dissent and Ideology Score Relative to Center of Judge Pool – raw data
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Notes: x-axis: Ideology scores of a judge demeaned by the center of the pool of judges available to be
assigned in a Circuit-year. The x-axis is divided into 15 evenly-spaced bins (the number denotes the
midpoint of the bin) from left-to-right in ideology space, where more conservative scores are along the right
on the x-axis. y-axis: Average dissent rate for judges in the particular bin in that Circuit-year. The average
is a weighted average to account for the number of times the judge actually appeared on cases in that
Circuit-year. The dashed lines depict the 95% confidence interval. Data on cases comes from OpenJurist
(1950-2007). Ideology scores come from the Judicial Common Space database.
Our starting point is the rather intuitive empirical observation that the median judge
in a panel will more or less single-handedly determine the ideological component of the
opinion. This has the implication (which is further corroborated empirically) that those with
extreme ideology, seldom being the median in their panels, rarely affect the opinions of the
cases they are part of. Given this starting point we observe the following three stylized facts
that we aim to explain theoretically. The first fact—a within-judge observation—shows that
ideology plays an important role in a judge’s decision when to dissent: the more distanced
the median of the panel is from the judge, the more likely the judge is to dissent (see Figure
1 for the raw data and Table II which includes controls for judge fixed effects). The second
fact is a between-judge observation and is depicted in Figure 2 (see also Table III). It shows
that judges who are centrist, relative to the pool of judges they encounter over the course of
many cases, seldom dissent. Further, it shows that judges with moderate ideology relative to
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the pool (about half way to the right or left of the center) dissent the most. Finally, it shows
that extremist judges dissent very little. Together this creates, on each side of the center,
a hill-shaped relationship between ideology and the probability of dissent, which we aim to
explain. What is particularly noteworthy with this pattern is that extremists, who by the
very nature of their ideology are more often distant from their peers on a panel, choose to
dissent very little. This is surprising given that the extremists rarely affect the opinion and
given the first fact that ideological disagreements within panels drive dissent. The third fact
is that the voting pattern of judges (see Figure 3 and Table IV) is such that centrists do not
have a strong ideological component in their voting, moderately ideological judges have the
strongest ideological voting pattern and extremist judges do not have an ideologically biased
voting pattern.4
4Since there are less observations for the Ideology of Vote, the raw data cannot be used for presenting the
third fact. Instead we use local polynomial estimators (Fan and Gijbels 1996) which is essentially the second
best to presenting the raw data (Altman 1992).
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Figure 3.— Ideology of Vote and Ideology Score of Judge Relative to Center of Judge
Pool – local polynomial
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Notes: x-axis: Ideology scores of a judge demeaned by the center of the pool of judges available to be
assigned in a Circuit-year, where more conservative scores are along the right on the x-axis. y-axis:
Predicted vote ideology, demeaned to be centered at zero. The depicted prediction is based on a local
polynomial regression with an Epanechnikov kernel, where the dependent variable is ideology of a vote,
which is coded as 1 for conservative, 0 for mixed or not applicable, and -1 for liberal. The dashed lines
depict the 95% confidence interval. Data comes from the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Project
(1925-2002 5% Sample).
To explain these three empirical observations, we construct a simple model showing
that these observations are consistent with judges having a concave cost of deviating from
their ideological bliss points and with the existence of peer pressure against dissent. We fur-
ther test this theory against an alternative explanation—where dissent increases the chances
of reversal by the U.S. Supreme Court—and find that auxiliary predictions in which the two
theories differ corroborate our explanation and refute the alternative one.
The theoretical intuition behind our model is as follows. Consider a judge who is very
ideologically extreme. This judge will rarely be the median judge in the panel and in fact will
often be ideologically distant from the median judge. Hence, this extreme judge will rarely
be in a position where she can determine the opinion and, furthermore, she will very often
find herself having to decide whether or not to sign opinions very far from her ideological
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bliss point. Always dissenting on opinions she does not like would imply a very high collegial
pressure (Epstein et al. 2011) as she will be facing such opinions virtually all the time. On
the other hand, signing only some opinions while dissenting against others helps little when
the cost incurred by signing few unfavorable opinions instead of many is almost the same
(since the cost of deviating from one’s ideology is concave). Hence, facing a sufficiently high
collegial pressure, an extreme judge will tend to sign virtually all opinions—a low dissent
rate. In comparison, centrist judges, often being median, are bound to often determine the
panel’s opinion and hence will less often need to decide whether to sign unfavorable opinions.
So when they do face this problem, they might as well dissent and avoid the cost of deviating
from their ideological bliss point. Hence their overall dissent rate will be relatively low too.
Finally, the behavior of judges in between centrists and extremists will resemble that of the
centrists—they will tend to dissent when facing an unfavorable opinion—but will face this
situation more often than centrists and hence end up, in aggregate, dissenting the most of
all judges.
This model of behavior predicts three empirical patterns. Firstly, to the extent that a
judge dissents, she will do so when she is far from the median of the panel, hence the proba-
bility of dissent should increase with the distance between the judge’s ideology and the panel
median, which is consistent with the first fact (see Figure 1). Secondly, as just explained,
there will be a hill-shaped relationship between ideological extremeness and dissent, which
is consistent with the second fact (see Figure 2). Thirdly, the ideological component of the
aggregate voting pattern should be weak for centrist judges (since they are ideologically neu-
tral), strong for moderate leftists and rightists (since they dissent against most ideologically
unfavorable opinions) and weak for extremists (since they cave in ideologically and mostly
vote with the majority). This is consistent with the third fact (see Figure 3).
Apart from the empirical observation (and the theoretical prediction) that extreme
judges surrender ideologically, two further results and implications are worth noting. First,
the above logic does not hold if costs are linear or convex. We present necessary and sufficient
conditions for the extent of concavity needed for the theory to align with the empirical
observations. Second, our findings suggest that the ideological caving in occurs when the
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judge is ideologically extreme relative to her peers (in the pool). So the empirics and theory
are essentially about the interaction between peers who disagree ideologically—it is not about
extreme ideology per se.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we outline the judicial
process more in detail and describe the data, estimation and main empirical facts that we
aim to explain. In Section 3 we describe the model and its results, including some auxiliary
predictions. In Section 4 we test these auxiliary predictions against an alternative theory.
Section 5 concludes. The appendix contains all proofs, additional empirical results and a
brief, yet formal, description of the alternative theory.
2 Judicial Decision-Making on Panels
2.1 Institutional backgroundThe U.S. Federal Courts are a system of local level (Dis-
trict Court), intermediate level (Circuit Court), and national level (Supreme Court) councils.
Members of these are appointed by the U.S. President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate.
They are responsible for the adjudication of disputes involving federal law. Their decisions
establish precedent for adjudication in future cases in the same court and in lower courts
within its geographic boundaries. Each state has 1–4 District Courts. The 94 U.S. District
Courts serve as trial courts with juries. The 12 U.S. Circuit Courts (Courts of Appeals) take
cases appealed from the District Courts. The Circuit Courts have no juries. Each Circuit
Court presides over 3–9 states. Figure 4 displays District Court boundaries in dotted lines
and Circuit Court boundaries in solid lines.
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Figure 4.— Geographical Boundaries of U.S. Federal Courts 3/24/14, 7:56 PMCircuit Map.ai -- Page 1
Page 1 of 1file:///Users/chendan/Desktop/New%20Folder%20With%20Items/US_Court_of_Appeals_and_District_Court_map.svg
Notes: Boundaries of the 94 District Courts are represented in dotted lines. Numbers indicate the 12
Circuit Courts, with the Washington, D.C. Circuit being the 12th.
The Circuit Courts decide cases that provide new interpretations of prior precedents,
which expand or contract the space of actions under which an actor can be found liable
(Gennaioli and Shleifer 2007). State officials regularly update a set of guidelines to identify
actions and regulations that may result in costly litigation after Circuit-Court decisions
(Frost and Lindquist 2010; Pollak 2001). Circuit Courts, which are the empirical focus of
this paper, rule on the application of federal law, such as the constitutional validity of state
laws, among other things. 98% of their decisions are final.5
In Circuit Courts, each case has three randomly assigned judges. We refer to this as
the panel. The judges are drawn from a pool of 8–40 judges (depending on the circuit) who
have life tenure. The three judges decide a binary verdict (affirming or overturning the lower
court verdict). A majority of two judges is needed to set the verdict.
They also compose an opinion (i.e., a text) motivating the verdict. The opinion
serves as precedent for future cases and as such has a large impact on society and policy.
Furthermore, being a text rather than a binary element, the opinion can reflect the assertive-
ness of the panel and its ideological composition. A judge has to write a separate (minority)
5In the remaining 2% that are appealed to the Supreme Court, 30% are affirmed.
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opinion if she either dissents—votes against the binary verdict—or concurs—votes for the
verdict but for a different reason, as manifested in her minority opinion. Both dissents and
concurrences are costly in terms of time and collegiality and they cannot be cited as bind-
ing precedent. Note that, for a judge, dissenting and concurring are two mutually exclusive
actions that both represent a form of dissatisfaction with the majority opinion.
2.2 DataThe data we present comes from Openjurist, which contains all cases from 1950
to 2007. The data was first digitized by one of the authors (in Berdejó and Chen 2014) for
whether there was a dissenting opinion and whether there was a concurring opinion. The
current paper extracts the judge names and merges each judge with his/her ideology score.
The ideological score we use is a standard summary measure using the voting patterns of
the appointing President and home-state Senators, coming from the Judicial Common Space
database (Epstein et al. 2007). This score exploits the norm of senatorial courtesy and is
constructed as follows. If a judge is appointed from a state where the President and at least
one home-state Senator is of the same party, the nominee is assigned a score of the home-
state Senator6 (or the average of the home-state Senators if both members of the delegation
are from the President’s party). If neither home-state Senator is of the President’s party,
the nominee receives the score of the appointing President. This score has been shown to
outperform other common measures, such as the party of the appointing President or the
ideology of the state from which the judge is selected (Giles et al. 2001).7
To examine the ideological color of the opinion and of the judge’s vote on each panel,
we also employ the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Project, a random sample of roughly
5% of appeals courts decisions from 1925 to 2002.8 This database includes additional hand-
coded information on the ideological content of the opinion (liberal = -1, conservative = 1,
6The scores of the Senators are located in a two-dimensional space on the basis of the positions that they
take in roll-call votes, but only the first of the two dimensions is salient for most purposes. The ideology
scores of Presidents are then estimated along this same dimension based on the public positions that they
take on bills before Congress.
7As a robustness check we use the party of appointing President as ideology score—see Appendix Section B.
See for instance Appendix Table A.2.
8Documentation and data available at http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appctdata.htm.
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and mixed or unable to code = 0).9
Our sample contains 293,868 decisions from 1950 to 2007 (Openjurist) and 18,686
decisions for the period 1925 to 2002 (Courts of appeals database). Overall, 7.9% of opinions
from 1925 to 2002 have dissents (3.6% have concurrences) while 8.5% of opinions from 1950
to 2007 have dissents (6.4% have concurrences).
We begin by calculating the average ideology score of the pool of judges in each Circuit
and each year. This average score represents the center of the pool of judges available to be
assigned, which we will refer to as Center of Judge Pool. Next, we calculate the absolute
distance from each judge’s ideology score to the center of her pool for each Circuit and each
year.10 We will refer to this measure as Distance to Center of Judge Pool. We will also
consider Score relative to Center of Judge Pool, which refers to the ideology score of a
judge that is demeaned by the center of the pool, so it can take both positive and negative
values. In the Judicial Common Space, positive values are conservative and negative values
are liberal.11 A histogram of this measure is displayed in Appendix Figure A.1. We also
construct a measure for the absolute distance between a judge’s ideology score and the panel
median and refer to it as Distance to Panel Median.12 Finally, we calculate the dissent
rate and concurrence rate for each judge in each Circuit-year.13 The total number of votes
per Circuit-year is calculated to account for the number of times the judge actually appeared
on cases in that Circuit-year.14
9Their original coding was exactly the opposite but we flipped it to be in line with our coding of ideological
scores, where positive values correspond to conservative views. The Appeals Court Database Project states
that for most (but not all) issue categories, these will correspond to conventional notions of “liberal” and
“conservative”. For example, decisions supporting the position of the defendant in a criminal procedure case,
the plaintiff who asserts a violation of her First Amendment rights, and the Secretary of Labor who sues a
corporation for violation of child labor regulations would all be coded as “liberal”.
10We use Circuit and year since this represents the ideology of the other judges a specific judge may actually
be sitting with in a panel.
11We also merge in the Martin Quinn Supreme Court scores (Martin and Quinn 2002) and construct Dis-
tance to Supreme Court when we examine the alternative theory where Circuit Court judges are
dissenting to signal the Supreme Court to review and revoke the panel’s decision.
12Any analysis requiring the panel median includes only panels where there are no tied or missing scores.
13As robustness checks, we calculate the dissent and the concurrence rate for each judge in a 2-year bin and
over a judge’s lifetime.
14As robustness checks, we weight each judge equally but remove any visiting judge who appeared less than
10 times in a Circuit-year.
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2.3 Who determines the ideological color of the opinion?We begin by examining
the correlation between the conservative ideology of the opinion and the ideology score of
the judges in the panel. To conduct these analyses, we turn to the U.S. Courts of Appeals
Database Project (containing the ideological color of the opinion). We identify panel mem-
bers according to whether they had the median ideology score in the panel. We regress the
Ideology of the Opinion on a judge’s Score relative to Center of Judge Pool and its
interaction with whether the judge is the median of the panel:15
(1)
OpinionIdeologypcit = γ1ScoreRelative toCenter of JudgePoolcit+
γ2ScoreRelative toCenter of JudgePoolcit ∗ 1 (i ismedianpcit)+
γ31 (i ismedianpcit) + νpcit
for judge i on panel p in Circuit c and year t. If the ideology of a judge influences the opinion,
we should expect a positive relationship between the judge’s ideology score (where conserva-
tive values increase as we move to the right of the x-axis) and the likelihood of a conservative
opinion. Table I confirms that only the median judge’s ideology score is correlated with the
opinion, and that this correlation is positive.16 Figure 5 visualizes results from the table and
shows that the median judge is driving the ideological color of the opinion.
15We use scores relative to center of judge pool (and not ideology scores per se) because when the entire
circuit moves to the left or to the right, panelists’ scores move accordingly and become slightly correlated
with the ideological content of the opinion even without actually affecting it.
16The regression includes only three-judge panels where there are no tied or missing scores and clusters
standard errors at the Circuit-year level. Appendix Table A.1 presents a robustness check of this result.
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Figure 5.— Ideology of Opinion and Ideology Scores of Panel Members
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Notes: x-axis: Ideology score of a judge demeaned by the center of the pool of judges available to be
assigned in a Circuit-year, where relatively more conservative scores are along the right on the x-axis.
y-axis: Opinion’s ideology, which is coded as 1 for conservative, 0 for mixed or not applicable, and -1 for
liberal, and each dot represents the average of many opinions in a bin of judges with similar ideology
scores. The y-axis is demeaned to be centered around zero. Data comes from the U.S. Courts of Appeals
Database Project (1925-2002 5% Sample). Sample includes three-judge panels where there are no tied or
missing scores.
TABLE I
Ideology of Opinion and Ideology Scores of Panel Members
(1)
Opinion Ideology
Score Relative to Center of Judge Pool 0.0166
(0.0125)
Panel Median 0.00118
(0.000775)
Score Relative to Center of Judge Pool 0.142***
* Panel Median (0.0409)
N 23031
R-sq 0.001
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the circuit-year level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01). Data comes from the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Project (1925-2002 5% Sample).
Sample includes three-judge panels where there are no tied or missing scores. The dependent variable is
opinion ideology, which is coded as 1 for conservative, 0 for mixed or not applicable, and -1 for liberal.
As a consequence of the median judge being decisive in forming the opinion, extremist
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judges, seldom being median, have a very small impact on the opinions. We corroborate that
this is indeed true in Appendix Figure A.3. We show there that the predicted ideology of
the panel’s opinion has an S-shaped pattern as a function of a judge’s Distance to Center
of Judge Pool. That is, when a judge becomes sufficiently extreme, there is a negative
relationship between her ideology and the opinion of the panel she sits in.
The conclusion from this empirical analysis is that the median of the panel is deter-
mining the opinion, as in many conventional bargaining models. We will utilize this when
developing the model.
2.4 Stylized fact 1: Probability of dissent and distance to panel medianFigure 1
presents a non-parametric visualization of the yearly dissent rates by ideological distance of a
judge to the median of a panel. For each of 15 evenly-spaced bins from the left-most to right-
most score, we estimated the average dissent rate for all judge-case combinations in that bin.
The dashed lines present the 95% confidence interval around the mean of the dissent rate.17
We present similar non-parametric visualizations for concurrences in Appendix Figure A.4.
These figures reveal a clear pattern. The more a judge is distant from the panel median, the
more likely she is to dissent or concur. This holds on both the left and the right.
To test whether this pattern is statistically significant, we regress the dissent and
concurrence rates of each judge-case combination on polynomials of the judge’s Distance
to the Panel Median—an absolute value which captures how much a judge disagrees
ideologically with her panel peers. To verify that the result is not driven by the ideology
scores of judges per se we add judge fixed effects. We also include Circuit (Cc) and year (Tt)
fixed effects and cluster the standard errors by Circuit-year. The basic regression specification
is:
(2)
Dissentpcit = γ1Distance toPanelMedianpcit+
γ2Distance toPanelMedian
2
pcit + Ii + Cc + Tt + νpcit
for judge i on panel p in Circuit c and year t. Table II indicates that the pattern is robust
for both dissents and concurrences even when adding judge fixed effects. This shows that
17We ran a regression of the dissent decision on a constant for each bin.
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ideological disagreement is an important driver of dissent.
TABLE II
Dissent and Ideological Distance to Median of Panel
(1) (2)
Dissent Concur
Distance to Median of Panel 0.00425*** 0.00244***
(0.00119) (0.000907)
Distance2 -0.00142 -0.000868
(0.00154) (0.00116)
Judge Fixed Effects Y Y
Circuit Fixed Effects Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y
N 541163 541163
R-sq 0.411 0.414
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the circuit-year level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01). Data on cases comes from OpenJurist (1950-2007). Ideology scores come from the Judicial
Common Space database. Ideology scores are demeaned by the actual center of the panel of judges assigned
on a case. The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a judge dissented (column 1) or concurred
(column 2) in the panel. Fixed effects include year, circuit, and judge.
Based on these results we formulate the following stylized fact:
Fact 1 For each judge, the probability of dissent increases the more she is distant from the
ideology of the panel median.
2.5 Stylized fact 2: Probability of dissent and distance to pool centerFigure 2
presents a non-parametric visualization of the yearly dissent rates by ideological distance
to the center of a judge’s pool. For each of 15 evenly-spaced bins from the left-most to
right-most score, we estimated the average of the yearly dissent rates of judges in that bin.
The average is a weighted average to account for the number of times the judge actually
appeared on cases in that Circuit-year. We also present the 95% confidence interval around
the weighted mean of the dissent rate.18
Intuitively, one might expect that the more distant a judge is from the pool center in
a Circuit-year, the more she will be inclined to write separate minority opinions (dissent or
18We ran a weighted regression of the dissent rate on a constant for each bin with weights being the number
of votes cast by the judge in that Circuit-year.
16
concur).19 But the figure reveals a surprising pattern: starting from the left, the most extreme
judges rarely dissent, then there is a marked increase in dissent rates as judges become more
moderate (bins 2 to 4), followed by a decrease in dissent rates towards the center of the
judicial pool. A similar (yet less pronounced) pattern appears on the right. We will refer
to this pattern as a spider-pattern, due the figure’s resemblance of the body and legs of a
spider. Appendix Figure A.5 shows that this pattern is robust to using the yearly number of
pages of dissent a judge writes in a Circuit-year instead of the yearly rate of occurrence of
dissent, so it is not the case that extremists simply put more time on one dissent.
As further evidence for the spider pattern, Appendix Figure A.6 presents the average
yearly concurrence rate of judges according to the distance to the center of their respective
pool of judges. We analyze concurrences separately from dissents as these are legally distinct
and are mutually exclusive—a judge cannot dissent and concur at the same time. However, in
our model and in the empirical tests we run, we mostly treat them together as two alternative
manifestations of the same thing: A judge’s decision not to sign her panel’s opinion. Notably,
the pattern of the spider is robust: concurrence rates are surprisingly uncommon for the most
extreme judges, the rate is higher for judges at moderate distance to the center and lower
again for the judges at the very center. Finding these patterns for dissents and concurrences
separately decreases the likelihood that they are statistical artifacts.
We also regress the dissent and concurrence rate of each judge on polynomials of her
(absolute) distance to the center of the pool of judges in her Circuit-year:
(3)
DissentRatecit = γ1Distance toCenter of JudgePoolcit+
γ2Distance toCenter of JudgePool
2
cit + Cc + Tt + νcit
for judge i in Circuit c and year t. Circuit and year fixed effects are represented by Cc and
Tt and standard errors are clustered by Circuit-year.20 Table III indicates that the pattern is
robust: according to the estimated linear and quadratic coefficients in the table the maximum
dissent is obtained for distance to the center of the judge pool of 0.6 (for dissents) and 0.46
19In Appendix A.2 we show that judges who are more distant from the pool center have indeed a higher
probability to be also more distant from the panel median.
20Since this is a between-judge result, we do not use judge fixed effects. See the appendix for lifetime results.
17
(for concurrences) which are clearly within the bounds of our distribution which goes from
around -0.8 to +0.8. Additional robustness checks are reported in Appendix Tables A.2 and
A.3. Appendix Table A.4 controls for personal characteristics of judges. Appendix Figure A.7
shows the pattern obtained using the estimates (including fixed effects) from the Appendix
Table A.3 (column 1).21 Based on these results we formulate the following stylized fact:
Fact 2 There is a hill-shaped relationship between a judge’s dissent rate and the absolute
distance to her pool center.
TABLE III
Dissent and Ideological Distance to Center of Judge Pool
(1) (2)
Dissent Concur
Distance to Center of Judge Pool 0.0404*** 0.0285***
(0.00756) (0.00570)
Distance2 -0.0334*** -0.0313***
(0.0118) (0.00862)
Circuit Fixed Effects Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y
N 10043 10043
R-sq 0.109 0.086
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the circuit-year level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01). Data on cases comes from OpenJurist (1950-2007). Ideology scores come from the Judicial
Common Space database. The main independent variable is (the absolute value of) ideology score
demeaned by the center of the pool of judges available to be assigned in a Circuit-year. The dependent
variable is the judge’s dissent rate (column 1) or concurrence rate (column 2) in a Circuit-year. Fixed
effects include year and circuit. Observations are weighted by the number of votes cast by the judge in the
Circuit-year.
2.6 Stylized fact 3: Ideological voting pattern and distance to pool centerNext,
we investigate the relationship between a judge’s ideology and the ideological color of her
21Appendix Table A.2 shows that the results are also robust to using an alternative measure of ideological
score (i.e., the party of appointment); weighting each judge equally (rather than according to the number
of votes) and dropping visiting judges; and using higher levels of aggregation (e.g., 2 year or lifetime rates,
where there is one observation per judge). They are also robust to including higher-order polynomials, run-
ning logit, and controlling for Distance to Supreme Court or Distance to Median of Panel when examining
the decision to dissent or concur at the panel-level. In that table, we show that when the Distance to
Center of Judge Pool is randomly re-assigned to another observation, there is no relationship, which
further mitigates the concern that the documented relationship is a statistical artifact. Appendix Table
A.5 further shows that the pattern is robust to splitting the sample according to whether the case affirmed
or reversed the lower court decision.
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votes. The Ideology of a Vote was constructed as follows. The ideology of every opinion
and every dissent and concur text (minority opinion) was hand-coded by an NSF-sponsored
team of researchers. For example, opinions in favor of the defendant in a criminal case, or
for a newspaper editor opposing an attempt at censorship, or for a union that claims that
management violated labor laws when it fired a worker for union-organizing activities would
all be coded as “liberal” (-1). Conservative texts are coded as +1. However, some issues
are not easily categorized along a liberal/conservative dimension (e.g., attorney discipline
cases).22 Mixed outcomes, directionality that could not be determined, or outcomes that
could not be classified according to any conventional outcome standards, were assigned a
value of “0”. Ideology of a judge’s vote is set to equal the ideology of the opinion if the judge
did not dissent and to equal the ideology of her own minority opinion if the judge dissented
or concurred.
We test the relationship between a judge’s ideology and the ideological color of her
votes by using local polynomial estimators.23 The results are presented in Figure 3. As can be
seen, the strongest ideological bias is obtained for moderately ideological judges and once a
judge becomes sufficiently extreme her voting becomes less ideological. To test the robustness
of this result we also run the regression:
V otepcit = γ1ScoreRelative toCenter of JudgePoolcit+
γ2ScoreRelative toCenter of JudgePool
2
cit+
γ3ScoreRelative toCenter of JudgePool
3
cit + νpcit
for judge i on panel p in Circuit c and year t.24 The results, which confirm the local polynomial
estimators, are presented in Table IV column 1 and are visualized in Figure A.8 in the
22The directionality codes parallel closely the directionality codes in the Spaeth Supreme Court database.
23Local location estimators are a set of techniques for data description, for estimating a regression curve
without making strong assumptions about the shape of the true regression function, and for checking
parametric models (Altman 1992). Running averages is a very simple type of smoother and the local
polynomial estimator is a data-driven way of choosing the amount of smoothing (Fan and Gijbels 1996).
24We use polynomial of the third degree in the regression to enable testing for a U-shape on the left and a
hill-shape on the right.
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Appendix.25 It is worth noting that this result disappears when considering judge scores
which are not relative to the pool (Table IV column 2 and a visualization in Appendix
Figure A.10). Hence, what is important is that a judge is ideologically extreme relative to
her peers—it is not about extreme ideology per se, but about the interaction between peers
who disagree ideologically. Based on this we formulate the following stylized fact:
Fact 3 The ideological bias in judges’ votes is most pronounced for judges who are mod-
erately leftist or rightist.
TABLE IV
Ideology of Vote and Ideology Score of Judge Relative to Center of Judge Pool
(1) (2)
   Vote Ideology 
Score Relative to Center of Judge Pool 0.180***
(0.0308)
Relative Score
2 0.0614
(0.0659)
Relative Score
3 -0.366***
(0.125)
Score 0.141***
(0.0422)
Score2 0.0788
(0.0642)
Score3 0.145
(0.178)
N 23031 23031
R-sq 0.002 0.004
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the circuit-year level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01). Data on cases comes from the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Project (1925-2002 5%
Sample). Ideology scores come from the Judicial Common Space database. Sample includes three-judge
panels where there are no tied or missing scores. The dependent variable is ideology of a vote, which is
coded as 1 for conservative, 0 for mixed or not applicable, and -1 for liberal. The main independent
variables are ideology score demeaned by the center of the pool of judges available to be assigned in a
Circuit-year (column 1) and ideology score (column 2).
25Appendix Table A.6 reports that the relationship is robust to using the lifetime average for each judge.
The relationships are also robust to including higher-order polynomial terms (Appendix Table A.7). The
pattern is also robust to splitting the sample according to whether the case affirmed the lower court decision
(Appendix Table A.8).
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3 Theoretical Model
We will now construct a theoretical model to explain Facts 1-3. We keep it as simple
as possible in order to highlight the mechanism.
Three judges (t1, t2 and t3) are randomly and independently drawn from a uniform
distribution F (t) ∼ U(−1, 1) to sit together on a panel.26 We call the distribution F (t) the
pool of judges. The three judges in the panel bargain and eventually produce an opinion v ∈ R
through a Condorcet voting process: judges can (indefinitely) propose opinions, and any new
proposal competes (by voting of the three judges) against the current leading opinion until
a final decision is reached. Judges want the opinion to reflect their bliss points (t). Hence, a
judge t gets a disutility O (t) from sitting in panels that set opinions v 6= t, where O (t) is
increasing in the number of such opinions and in their distance from the bliss point t. Let
k (v) denote the overall distribution of opinions (the pdf) and let k (v|t) be the distribution
of opinions that judge t is facing during her judicial term, with support in V ⊂ R.27 For
each opinion v, a judge needs to decide whether to sign it or whether to dissent against it.28
When signing an opinion v 6= t, the judge is making a compromise and, on top of O (t), has
to bear the inner discomfort associated with actively approving it. This is captured by a
separate cost function
D = D
(ˆ
V
|t− v| k (v|t) s (v) dv
)
where s (v) is an indicator function that equals 1 if the judge chooses to sign an opinion and
equals 0 if she dissents. For tractability we assume D is a power function
D(x) = xα
26We use a uniform distribution mainly for tractability but most of our results hold under any single peaked
distribution. The true empirical distribution of judges is presented in Appendix Figure A.1.
27The distribution of opinions faced by judge t is dependent of t since it affects who is median and hence
determines the verdict through the voting process.
28We treat dissent and concurrence as the same thing—a refusal to sign the chosen opinion v.
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where α > 0 which means the ideological cost is increasing the larger the number of unfa-
vorable opinions a judge signs and the more unfavorable each opinion she signs is. In total,
a judge of type t has the loss function
L = O (t) +D
(ˆ
V
|t− v| k (v|t) s (v) dv
)
+W
ˆ
V
(1− s (v)) k (v|t) dv,
where W is a constant marginal cost of dissent. Alternatively, W can be interpreted as
capturing the effort of writing a separate opinion. The last term in the loss function thus
captures the total cost of dissent arising from collegial pressure.29
3.1 Bargaining outcomeFrom the model specification it is clear that for any signing
strategy s (v) chosen by a judge t, L is increasing in |t− v|. Hence, each judge will strive
to minimize |t− v| during the bargaining process. As a consequence, the opinion in each
panel will be solely determined by the bliss point of the median judge in that panel which
we denote by tm –.
Lemma 1 In all panels v = tm.
This result is simple so we only provide the following heuristic proof. That the median
decides is intuitive given the Condorcet voting process. To see this, note that both the other
two judges cannot be better off at the same time by signing any v 6= tm. Hence, these two
judges cannot form a coalition and propose an opinion that would win over v = tm. As
discussed in the introduction (and shown in Table I and Figure 5), this result has empirical
support. We next use it as our starting point for the analysis of the individual decision
making.
3.2 Within-judge variation: To sign or not to sign?The deterministic nature of v
in a given panel implies that the individual decision of a judge whether to sign an opinion
or not can be analyzed taking v as given. Clearly, for the median judge in a panel, signing is
optimal. As for the other judges in that panel, note first that O (t) is independent of signing
29We let the dissent cost be linear in the number of dissents for tractability. The results hold qualitatively
also for convex and concave collegial pressure functions and only changes the threshold values of α in the
upcoming propositions.
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or not. Therefore, the first argument in the loss function, O (t) , does not affect any signing
decision made by a judge. Each of these judges therefore minimizes
l (s (v) ; t) ≡ L−O (t) = D
(ˆ
V
|t− v| k (v|t) s (v) dv
)
+W
ˆ
V
(1− s (v)) k (v|t) dv.
We will now rewrite this expression in a form that is more convenient for analysis. This can
be done by noting the following result.
Proposition 1 Every judge t has a unique cutoff c(t) such that she signs opinion v if and
only if |t− v| < c(t).
Proof: See Appendix C. Q.E.D.
The proposition says that the optimal strategy for a judge is to dissent against opin-
ions that are sufficiently far from her bliss point. This is of course natural since, otherwise,
there would exist two opinions v1 and v2, such that |t− v1| < |t− v2| yet judge t is willing
to sign v2 while refusing to sign v1, in which case she could lower her loss by inverting this
pair of choices. Put in an empirical context, the proposition says that the probability of
dissent should increase the further away the judge is from the median of the panel (who, as
established, sets the opinion). Hence, this result explains Fact 1.
Following this result, the choice of a judge boils down to choosing the cutoff c. Rewrit-
ing the loss function, the minimization problem for judge t is given by
min
c
l = min
c
D
 t+cˆ
t−c
|t− v| k (v|t) dv
+W
1− t+cˆ
t−c
k (v|t) dv
 .
The first argument expresses the disutility associated with signing opinions that deviate
from the judge’s bliss point and the second argument expresses the disutility associated with
not signing the other opinions—i.e., the collegial pressure (or cost of effort) when writing a
minority opinion.
We turn now to explicitly express the opinion distribution k(v|t) in terms of the
judges’ type distribution F (t) and the corresponding density function f(t). For a given judge
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t, the probability of having an opinion to her left is K (t) = Pr (tm < t) = [F (t)]
2, as this
happens if and only if both other judges have bliss points below t. Similarly, Pr (v > t) =
Pr (tm > t) = [1− F (t)]2. In the remaining cases, judge t is the median, in which case
|t− v| = 0. This means that k(v|t) = 2F (v) f (v) in the range v < t and k(v|t) =
2 [1− F (t)] f (v) in the range v > t. It also follows that the probability of dissent for judge
t who uses a cutoff c is given by
[F (t− c)]2 + [1− F (t+ c)]2 ,
and the minimization problem of judge t becomes
min
c

D
(
t´
t−c
(t− v) 2F (v) f (v) dv +
t+c´
t
(v − t) 2 (1− F (v)) f (v) dv
)
+W
[
[F (t− c)]2 + [1− F (t+ c)]2]
 .
3.3 Between-judge variation: Dissent patternWe move now to explain the spider
pattern of Fact 2—a hill-shaped relationship between a judge’s dissent rate and her absolute
distance to the center of the judge pool (which is zero in our model). The probability that
type t dissents is determined by two main factors. The first is the distribution of other
judges’ types and the location of t with respect to this distribution. For any given cutoff c,
the probability of dissent is determined by the concentration of judges within and outside
this cutoff. Hence, under a uniform (or a single-peaked) distribution of judges, a judge at
the tail of the distribution is bound to encounter more panels where both other judges are
outside a given cutoff c compared to a judge with the same cutoff but whose bliss point is
at the center of the distribution. The second decisive factor is the value of the cutoff itself.
For any given judge t, larger c implies less dissent. As c is endogenously chosen, the function
c(t) has implications for the probability of dissent of each type, denoted by P (t).
Lemma 2 If c(t) is locally decreasing in |t| then P (t) is locally increasing in |t|.
Proof: Follows from Lemma 4 in Appendix D. Q.E.D.
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The lemma expresses the notion that a judge who is both more extreme and has a
smaller cutoff (hence is pickier) will dissent more. The formal proof is in the appendix but
the intuition follows directly from the two factors discussed above: A judge who is more
extreme encounters more panels in which the median is beyond her cutoff, and more so if
the cutoff is smaller. For consistency with Fact 2 it thus must hold that c(t) is not locally
increasing toward the edges of the distribution of judges. This turns out to imply that the
function D, which aggregates the inner cost of judges, must be sufficiently concave.
Proposition 2 There exist values ofW such that P (t) is first increasing and the decreasing
in |t| if and only if α ≤ 2
3
.
Proof: See Appendix D. Q.E.D.
The proposition relates to our second stylized fact about the spider-pattern of dissent.
It states that the condition for the the spider pattern of dissent to arise is that judges have to
be sufficiently picky about small deviations from their ideological bliss points. We will first
explain why linear and convex cost functions do not yield a spider-pattern and then why a
sufficiently concave cost does.
Suppose first that D is linear. Then a judge’s location on the type distribution is
irrelevant for her choice whether to sign an opinion or not—only the trade-off between the
fixed cost W and the distance |t− v| matters.30 This implies that c would be the same for
all judges, and so judges who are more often far from the opinion (i.e., extreme judges),
would tend to dissent more than others, contradicting the spider-pattern. Now suppose D is
convex, so that a judge incurs an inner cost only when deviating quite a lot from her bliss
point (in terms of both the number of times and the deviation size). Thus, a judge’s location
on the type distribution will be crucial for her choice strategy. Judges in the center of the
bell-shaped distribution are rarely allocated to panels where their views are far from the
opinion (i.e., far from the median judge), hence will be willing to sign the opinion in these
few rare cases. Meanwhile, judges at the tails of the distribution will encounter many such
30To see this, note that for any given signature strategy, the linearity of D implies that signing another
opinion v would impose a cost of |t− v|, potentially multiplied by some constant, and dissenting against v
would impose a cost W .
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cases, and will have to consider larger deviations on average. As a convex D implies a steep
rising slope of the inner discomfort cost when compromising a lot, these judges will not be
willing to compromise a lot. In particular, they will not compromise as much as needed in
order to produce the spider pattern, in which these judges are supposed to dissent less than
their more moderate colleagues. Hence, a convex D cannot produce a spider pattern.
As the proposition expresses, a sufficiently concaveD does give rise to a spider pattern.
A very concave D implies that a judge feels a very high ideological cost even if she signs
only few opinions that are even a little bit distant from her bliss point. This means that a
judge will either sign nothing that does not equal her bliss point, or sign almost anything. To
see why the spider pattern can arise under such circumstances, note that the spider pattern
requires first an increasing dissent rate when going from centrist judges (t close to 0) to
moderately ideological judges (t, say, close to ±0.5) and then a decreasing dissent rate as
judges become very extreme (t close to ±1). When |t| is small, a judge will often be median,
in which case she will not need to even consider signing unfavorable opinions. In the other
cases, where the judge will have to make a decision whether to sign an unfavorable opinion,
the marginal cost of signing will be very high since D is concave. The relatively low frequency
in which this happens implies that such judges will choose to virtually always dissent when
they are not median. Put differently, c will either be zero or very small. This strict adherence
to ideals will hold also for judges who are more ideologically inclined yet not too extreme.
The increasing probability of dissent in this range arises from the basic statistical fact that
these more ideological judges will less often be the median of their panels hence will have
more opportunities to dissent.
As a judge becomes sufficiently extreme, however, always dissenting becomes very
costly since that would imply dissenting in virtually all panels she is part of (as she is
very seldom median). Furthermore, when D is concave, once that judge signs an unfavorable
opinion, she might as well sign almost anything. Hence, an extreme judge, facing a sufficiently
high pressure, will give up ideologically and surrender under the collegial pressure (c will be
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large).31
The most succinct form of the spider pattern appears when α is very small. For
instance, for α. 0.3, judges with small |t| have a cutoff c = 0, implying they dissent whenever
they are not median, while judges with large |t| have c = 1 + |t|, implying they never
dissent.32 This case is particularly tractable (see Appendix D.3.4) and, in the remainder
of this theoretical section, we will use it to illustrate how the model replicates Fact 3 and
provides additional empirical predictions.
3.4 Between-judge variation: Voting patternWe move now to explain our third styl-
ized fact—an S-shaped voting pattern where the moderately ideological judges have the
strongest ideological bias in their voting. To explain this fact analytically we construct a
measure of the ideology I(t) of a vote of judge t as follows:
I(t) =
 tm if s = 1t if s = 0
This formulation captures that by signing the majority opinion, a judge practically votes for
it. Meanwhile, the minority opinion of a dissenting judge equals her bliss point (t) because,
in this case, she needs to compose a separate opinion in which she can express whatever she
really thinks.33 This way, E[I(t)] captures the ideological bias of judge t’s voting pattern.
Proposition 3 There exists an α˜ (≈ 0.295) such that, for each α < α˜, there exists a
range of values of W for which |E[I(t)]| is maximized for an intermediate value of |t| (i.e.,
argmaxt |E[I(t)]| /∈ {−1, 0, 1})
Proof: See Appendix E. Q.E.D.
31Of course, if the cutoff c is infinite (or larger than |t| + 1) for a range of extreme judges, the dissent rate
will be zero. If the cutoff is such that also the extreme judges dissent against some opinions, then, recalling
the initial discussion in this subsection, the cutoff has to increase sufficiently fast in |t| so that the average
opinion does not become too distant for the most extreme judges. What creates a quickly increasing (or
constant but very large) c is if the marginal ideological cost (D′) is very small which is the case when D
is very concave.
32This leads to a spider pattern with a discontinuous drop to zero dissent. For larger values of α the spider
may be more smooth.
33In the data, the ideology of a vote equals the opinion if the judge signs it and otherwise equals the ideology
of her own text (the minority opinion), which has been coded separately.
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The proposition expresses a sufficient condition for when the ideological bias will be
most pronounced for moderately ideological judges—D has to be sufficiently concave. The
intuition is straightforward. As explained above, centrists and moderately ideological judges
will dissent virtually whenever they are not the median, hence will have I = t in almost all
cases. This implies that among them we will observe an increase in ideological bias as |t|
increases. Conversely, extreme judges almost never dissent, hence their voting pattern mostly
reflects the majority opinions they sign, which are determined by the median of their panels,
hence tend to be less biased than the moderates’s voting pattern.34
3.5 Additional predictions: The effect of collegial pressureNow that we have estab-
lished that ideological perfectionism – a concave D – along with collegial pressure rationalizes
the three stylized facts we set out to explain, we will move on to deriving some additional
predictions which we will use for testing our model against an alternative explanation. The
additional predictions pertain to how the dissent pattern is affected by a reduction in collegial
pressure.
Proposition 4 Consider the equilibrium described for α < α˜. Then: (i) if W = 0, P (t) is
monotonically increasing in |t|; and (ii) argmaxtP (t) is decreasing in W .
Proof: See Appendix F. Q.E.D.
Part (i) says that, should collegial pressure become very small, the spider pattern will
disappear and the dissent rate will be a purely increasing function of a judge’s extremeness.
The intuition for this is that, without collegial pressure, it becomes possible also for extreme
judges to be ideologically picky and hence dissent when they dislike the opinion even slightly.
Then, given that they are rarely the median in their panels, they will dissent more often than
the moderately ideological. Part (ii) of the proposition expresses that, as collegial pressure
increases, the range of judges who dissent whenever they are not the median shrinks. This
is of course natural since strictly adhering to one’s morals becomes more costly.
34The result of Proposition 3 holds also for other values of α ≤ 2/3 but this is harder to show analytically
since the pattern of dissent is more complex (see for instance appendix D.3.5).
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4 Empirical Testing of Our Model against an Alternative One
This section describes an alternative model that may explain the main stylized fact
(Fact 2), derives two predictions from this model that differ from the two predictions outlined
in Section 3.5, and tests the different predictions against each other empirically.
The alternative theory is one where a judge dissents, at a cost of collegial pressure,
in the hope that the U.S. Supreme Court (SCOTUS) will use this as a signal to review the
case and overturn the (binary) verdict. Majority voting within panels implies also here that
the median judge decides the verdict for the panel. In Appendix G we develop a simple
model capturing this mechanism (the model is inspired by the model in Beim et al. 2014).
The intuition for why this alternative SCOTUS model can produce a spider-shaped dissent
pattern is as follows. A judge compares, case by case, the cost of dissent with how wrongful
she thinks a certain verdict is. This means that two prerequisites need to be in place for a
judge to dissent: i) she needs to think that the verdict is sufficiently bad to warrant the cost of
dissent and ii) she needs to have the Supreme Court on her side as otherwise the verdict will
not be overturned anyway. Here, centrists on the one hand usually have the Supreme Court
on their side but on the other hand, often being the median, seldom encounter verdicts that
are too far from what they think is right. Hence they rarely dissent. Conversely, extremists
often dislike the verdict sufficiently to dissent but rarely have the Supreme Court on their
side, hence dissent seldom too. Finally, moderately ideological judges may have a larger set
of cases where they both sufficiently oppose the verdict and have the Supreme Court on
their side. In the appendix we show that this may create a spider-pattern of dissent. Two
additional predictions (the equivalent of Proposition 4) can be derived from the SCOTUS
model.
Proposition 5 Consider the SCOTUS model. Then: (i) if W = 0, P (t) is monotonically
decreasing in |t|; and (ii) argmax|t|P (|t|) is increasing in W .
Proof: See Appendix G. Q.E.D.
Prediction (i) of the SCOTUS model says that, as the collegial cost of dissent (W )
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approaches zero, the dissent rate becomes a decreasing function of judge’s extremeness. This
is intuitive since, when the collegial pressure is low, the only factor that determines whether
a judge dissents is whether she has the Supreme Court on her side (because there is no
collegial pressure against dissenting). This means that centrist judges will dissent very often.
Furthermore, the more extreme a judge is, the less likely it is that her preferences will be
aligned with the Supreme Court, which means that the dissent rate falls. This way, the
prediction of the SCOTUS model is opposite to the prediction of our main (perfectionism)
model where, as the collegial pressure goes to 0, the dissent rate increases with how extreme
the judge is (Proposition 4 part i).
Prediction (ii) of Proposition 5 refers to the consequences of an increase in the cost
of dissent. In the SCOTUS model, the judge at the peak of the spider-pattern is the one
for whom the threshold cutoff for dissent, as determined by the cost of dissent, exactly
equals her ideological distance to the Supreme Court, implying that she dissents against any
verdict that both she and the Supreme Court view as biased to the “wrong” side. Judges who
are more extreme dissent in these cases as well, but in total they are predicted to dissent
less because, compared to the judge at the peak, they have less objection to verdicts that
manifest extreme ideology on their side of the ideological spectrum, yet do not have the
Supreme Court on their side for overturning verdicts they consider to be too moderate. If
the cost of dissent increases, judges have to censor themselves more, hence the cutoff for
dissent is larger, implying that a judge has to be more ideologically extreme to be at the
peak of the spider-pattern. Therefore, the prediction of the SCOTUS model is that, as the
cost of dissent increases, the spider peak would move outwards. In the main model we had
the opposite prediction: an increase in the cost of dissent would have pushed the peak of the
spider inwards (Proposition 4 part ii).
4.1 Testing predictions for W→ 0When testing these opposite predictions (part i of
propositions 4 and 5), it is important to note that in the main model it is the Distance to
Center of Judge Pool that measures the extremeness, while in the SCOTUS model it is
the Distance to SCOTUS that measures a judge’s extremeness. To get a measure of the
Distance to SCOTUS, we use the Martin Quinn Supreme Court scores to put the judicial
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scores of the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court on the same metric (Martin and Quinn
2002).
To test the predictions, we use retired status of a judge as a proxy for a very low
cost of dissent. The motivation for this is as follows. Firstly, judges who have retired take a
reduced caseload, hence have more time to write dissents. Secondly, they arguably have lower
collegial pressure from colleagues or are less sensitive to such pressure. We first verify that
judges who have retired have a discontinuous drop in caseload from about 100 per year to
30 per year (Figure 6) and that caseload continues to decline gradually thereafter. Next, we
show that retired judges dissent more, discontinuously at the year of retirement (Figure 7),
and verify that the increase in dissents is not due to age. In fact, older judges are less likely
to dissent, which also explains the decline in dissent before retirement. Figure 7 visualizes
the following regression.35
DissentRateit = a+ b ∗ 1(Years afterRetirement ≥ 0)it+
c ∗Years afterRetirementit+
d ∗Years afterAppointmentit + νit
for judge i and year t.
35In appendix B.5 we show that age and experience vary smoothly around the retirement decision and we
also visualize the results of the regression presented in Table V.
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Figure 6.— Caseload and Years from Retirement
Graph 1/23/16, 5:18 PM
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Notes: Each dot represents the average caseload of judges with the same number of years relative to
retirement. Data on cases comes from OpenJurist (1950-2007).
Figure 7.— Dissent or Concurrence and Years from Retirement vs. Age
Graph 1/23/16, 5:20 PM
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Notes: Each dot represents the average sum of dissent rate and concurrence rate for judges with the same
number of years relative to retirement (left panel) or the same age (right panel) in a Circuit-year. The
average is a weighted average to account for the number of times the judge actually appeared on cases in
that Circuit-year. Data on cases comes from OpenJurist (1950-2007).
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To test the opposing prediction (i) of Propositions 4 and 5 we run the regression in
equation (3), limiting the sample to retired judges only.
As can be seen in Table V, for retired judges, the rate at which judges dissent or
concur is positively correlated with Distance to Center of Judge Pool (columns 1 and
5), which supports our main model. The rate at which judges dissent or concur is also
positively correlated with Distance to SCOTUS (columns 3 and 7), which goes against
the prediction of the SCOTUS model. Note also that the spider pattern disappears (columns
2, 4, 6 and 8), as predicted in Proposition 4. In total, these results provide support for the
main model and go against the prediction of the SCOTUS model.
TABLE V
Dissent or Concurrence and Ideology Score among Retired Judges
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Distance to Center of Judge Pool 0.0323*** 0.000569 0.0337*** 0.0115
(0.00810) (0.0244) (0.00814) (0.0250)
Distance to Center of Judge Pool2 0.0524 0.0365
(0.0418) (0.0420)
Distance to Supreme Court 0.0226*** 0.0488* 0.0253*** 0.0427
(0.00849) (0.0266) (0.00848) (0.0264)
Distance to Supreme Court2 -0.0444 -0.0296
(0.0466) (0.0463)
Control for Age and Experience N N N N Y Y Y Y
Circuit Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample
N 3353 3353 3673 3673 3353 3353 3673 3673
R-sq 0.090 0.091 0.081 0.082 0.094 0.094 0.087 0.088
Dissent or Concur
Senior Judges
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the circuit-year level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01). Data on cases comes from OpenJurist (1950-2007). Ideology scores come from the Judicial
Common Space database. Absolute values of the distance to the center of the judge pool or the Supreme
Court are the main independent variables. The dependent variable is the judge’s sum of dissent rate and
concurrence rate in a Circuit-year. Fixed effects include year and circuit. Observations are weighted by the
number of votes cast by the judge in the Circuit-year.
4.2 Testing predictions about the most dissenting judgeOur second test examines
the effect of an increase in the cost of dissent on who the most dissenting judge is (part
ii of propositions 4 and 5). To test this we follow Berdejó and Chen (2014), who find that
dissents decrease during wartime (Figure 8). For the purpose of our test, our assumption is
that this decrease is due to wars tending to increase social cohesion (increase W ). We test
the main (perfectionism) model’s prediction by examining how the dissent rate is affected
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by the interaction between a judge’s Distance to Center of Judge Pool and wartime.
(4)
DissentRatecit = a+ b ∗Distancecit + c ∗Distance2cit + d ∗Distancecit ∗ wartimet+
e ∗Distance2cit ∗ wartimet + f ∗ wartimet + νcit
for judge i in Circuit c and year t.
Figure 8.— The Effect of Wartime on Dissents
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We test the SCOTUS model’s prediction by running the same regression but using
Distance to SCOTUS as a measure of extremeness. The peak of the spider is determined
by the first-order condition of the regression equation. Therefore, to test for a shift in the
peak of the dissent rate, we test for a significant difference between −b
2c
and −(b+d)
2(c+e)
. If wartime
shifts the peak inwards (−b
2c
> −(b+d)
2(c+e)
), this would corroborate the main model and weaken
the SCOTUS model and vice versa. The regressions, the ratios, and the test statistics for
the equality of the coefficient ratios are reported in Table VI. Using Distance to Center
of Judge Pool, Column 2 reports that during war there is a significant inward shift of the
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peak of the spider, which is consistent with the main model. Using Distance to Supreme
Court, Column 4 rejects the significant outward shift that is predicted by the SCOTUS
model (in fact the coefficient even has the wrong sign). Judged together, the two tests seem
to refute the SCOTUS model while supporting the main model presented in this paper.
TABLE VI
Dissent or Concurrence and Ideology Score among Judges: Tests for changes in who
dissents the most due to increase in dissent costs during wartime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distancet 0.0610*** 0.0758***
(0.0136) (0.0121)
Distance2 -0.0387* -0.0965***
(0.0214) (0.0191)
Distance * Wartime -0.0608*** -0.0705***
(0.0187) (0.0201)
Distance2 * Wartime 0.0790** 0.101***
(0.0358) (0.0331)
Test for Difference in -1.584** -1.936
  Ratio of Coefficients (0.619) (11.74)
tDistance to:
N 8760 8760 8760 8760
R-sq 0.025 0.017
Dissent or Concur
Supreme CourtCenter of Judge Pool
Notes: Results of regression 4. Robust standard errors clustered at the circuit-year level in parentheses (* p
< 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Data on cases comes from OpenJurist (1950-2007). Absolute value of
the distance to the center of the judge pool (columns 1 and 2) and absolute value of the distance to
supreme court (columns 3 and 4) are the main independent variables of interest. The dependent variable is
the sum of a judge’s rates of dissent and concurrence in a Circuit-year. Observations are weighted by the
number of votes cast by the judge in the Circuit-year.
5 Conclusion
The main conclusion of this paper is that individuals are perfectionist when it comes
to morals or ideology: They do not distinguish much between small and large deviations
from their bliss points. The fact that individuals perceive the cost of such deviations to be
concave has far-reaching implications for their behavior, and we show how this is manifested
in important real-world decision making.
We study a high-stakes field setting where decisions have an ideological element, the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, while exploiting the fact that judges are randomly assigned to panels
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of three. In this setting, we present a consistent and robust set of evidence which together
suggest that judges with non-consensual world views ("extremists") cave-in ideologically:
They are less likely to dissent against the panel’s opinion than more moderate ones—although
they are less likely to set this opinion—and their voting pattern is less ideological.
We present a simple model of judicial decision making in panels, where dissenting
judges are subject to collegial pressure, and show that the observed patterns can emerge only
if judges perceive a sufficiently concave cost of agreeing to opinions they find dissatisfying. A
number of other model predictions are corroborated empirically. Furthermore, a competing
model about dissents as a way of drawing the attention of the Supreme-Court is analyzed and
rejected empirically. Our findings have direct and fundamental implications for how models
related to ideology and morals should be formulated. In particular, the cost of deviating from
one’s principles should be concave, and this further affects the empirical predictions derived
from models of ideological interaction.
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A Additional Empirical Results
This section presents some empirical results supporting the assumptions and intermediate results
from the model.
A.1 Histogram of Ideology ScoresAn assumption in the model is that the distribution of ideology
scores of judges is bell-shaped. Appendix Figure A.1 shows it roughly is for both Distance to Center of
Judge Pool and Distance to the Supreme Court.
Appendix Figure A.1.— Distribution of Relative Ideology Scores
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Notes: Ideology scores come from the Judicial Common Space database (Epstein et al. 2007), which
provides a summary measure using the voting patterns of the appointing President and home-state
Senators. Supreme Court ideology comes from Martin and Quinn (2002).
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A.2 Distance to the Panel MedianWe check if the most extreme judges are indeed, on average, more
distant from the median of their panels. Appendix Figure A.2 shows that this is the case. We plot the
relationship between Distance to Center of Judge Pool and the average distance to the median of the
judges’ panels.
Appendix Figure A.2.— Distance to Panel Median and Distance to Center of Judge
Pool
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Notes: x-axis: Absolute value of the distance to the center of the judge pool. y-axis: Absolute value of the
distance to the panel median. Data on cases comes from OpenJurist (1950-2007). Ideology scores come
from the Judicial Common Space database. Sample is restricted to panels where scores are available for all
three judges.
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B Robustness
B.1 Median decidesAppendix Table A.1 replicates the finding using a specification similar to a recent
study examining group decision-making (Ambrus et al. 2015). We also control for Center of Judge Pool
instead of subtracting it from the judge’s ideology score to show the relevance of the average ideology score
of the pool of judges in each Circuit and each year.
APPENDIX TABLE A.1
Ideology of Opinion and Ideology Scores of Panel Members
(1)
Opinion Ideology
Median of Panel Ideology Score 0.121***
(0.0354)
Left of Panel Ideology Score 0.0499
(0.0720)
Right of Panel Ideology Score 0.0373
(0.0448)
Center of Judge Pool 0.251*
  Ideology Score (0.133)
N 7677
R-sq 0.008
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the circuit-year level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01). Data comes from the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Project (1925-2002 5% Sample).
Sample includes three-judge panels where there are no tied or missing scores. The main independent
variable is the (non-demeaned) ideology score of a judge. The dependent variable is ideology of opinion,
which is coded as 1 for conservative, 0 for mixed or not applicable, and -1 for liberal.
Next, we investigate the relationship between a judge’s ideology and the ideological color of the
opinion. If the median of the panel is the primary driver of the opinion, then extreme judges should rarely
influence the outcome of the panel. We test this by running the regression
(5)
Opinion Ideologypcit = γ1Distance toCenter of JudgePoolcit+
γ2Distance toCenter of JudgePool
2
cit+
γ3Distance toCenter of JudgePool
3
cit + νpcit
for judge i on panel p in Circuit c and year t. The left schedule of Figure A.3 shows the pattern obtained using
the estimates from the regression. As can be seen, the strongest ideological bias is obtained for moderate
judges. Put differently extreme judges are not affecting the opinions (this result is robust to adding quartic
terms and splitting the sample according to affirmance). It is worth noting that this result disappears when
considering judge scores which are not relative to the panel. Hence, what is important is that a judge is
ideologically extreme relative to her peers—it is not about extreme ideology per se, but about the interaction
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between peers who disagree ideologically.36
Appendix Figure A.3.— Ideology of Opinion and Ideology Score of Judge Relative to
Center of Judge Pool – predicted pattern
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Notes: Ideology of opinion (demeaned by the center of the judge pool) from left to right as predicted by the
regression in equation (5), where the dependent variable is ideology of opinion, which is coded as 1 for
conservative, 0 for mixed or not applicable, and -1 for liberal. Aveage of predicted ideology of opinions is
displayed on the y-axis for each group of judges sharing a similar score. Data comes from the U.S. Courts
of Appeals Database Project (1925-2002 5% Sample).
36The relationship is robust to using the lifetime average for each judge. The relationships are also robust
to including higher-order polynomial terms.
42
B.2 Robustness for Fact 1
43
Appendix Figure A.4.— Concurrence and Ideology Score of Judge Relative to Median
of Panel – raw data
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in ideology space, where relatively more conservative scores are along the right on the x-axis. y-axis:
Proportion of concurrences over all votes in each bin. The dashed lines depict the 95% confidence interval.
Data on cases comes from OpenJurist (1950-2007). Ideology scores come from the Judicial Common Space
database.
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B.3 Robustness for Fact 2
45
Appendix Figure A.5.— Dissent Pages and Ideology Score of Judge Relative to Center
of Judge Pool – raw data
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Notes: x-axis: Ideology scores are demeaned by the center of the pool of judges available to be assigned in a
Circuit-year. The x-axis is divided into 15 evenly-spaced bins (the number denotes the midpoint of the bin)
from left-to-right in ideology space, where relatively more conservative scores are along the right on the
x-axis. y-axis: Average of number of pages of dissent written for judges in the particular bin in a
Circuit-year. The average is a weighted average to account for the number of times the judge actually
appeared on cases in that Circuit-year. The dashed lines depict the 95% confidence interval. Data on cases
comes from OpenJurist (1950-2007). Ideology scores come from the Judicial Common Space database.
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Appendix Figure A.6.— Concurrence and Ideology Score of Judge Relative to Center
of Judge Pool – raw data
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Notes: Ideology scores of a judge demeaned by the center of the pool of judges available to be assigned in a
Circuit-year. The x-axis is divided into 15 evenly-spaced bins (the number denotes the midpoint of the bin)
from left-to-right in ideology space, where relatively more conservative scores are along the right on the
x-axis. y-axis: Average concurrence rate for judges in the particular bin in that Circuit-year. The average is
a weighted average to account for the number of times the judge actually appeared on cases in that
Circuit-year. The dashed lines depict the 95% confidence interval. Data on cases comes from OpenJurist
(1950-2007). Ideology scores come from the Judicial Common Space database.
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We check if the spider is present under different weighting and scores. Appendix Table A.2 Column
1 repeats the main specification using Distance to Center of Judge Pool. Column 2 includes a cubic
term. Column 3 weights each judge equally but excludes judges who vote less than 10 times. Column 4 uses
a 2-year binned dissent or concur rate. Column 5 uses the lifetime average rate. Column 6 randomly assigns
Distance to Center of Judge Pool to a different judge to mitigate the concern of spurious significance.
Column 7 uses ideology scores that are simply a dummy indicator for the party of appointment. Column 8
uses the Distance to the Supreme Court. Column 9 uses both Distance to Center of Judge Pool
and Distance to the Supreme Court. Column 10 uses distance to median of panel. Column 11 includes
both distance to panel median and Distance to Center of Judge Pool. Notably, distance to panel median
does not yield a negative quadratic term in the quadratic regression, indicating that our results are about
the interaction with the peers in the Circuit rather than something about ideology per se or interaction with
a particular panel.
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APPENDIX TABLE A.3
Dissent and Quartic Polynomial in Ideology Score of Judge Relative to Center of Judge
Pool
(1) (2)
Dissent Concur
Distance to Center of Judge Pool 0.0434 0.0225
(0.0303) (0.0216)
Distance2 -0.186 -0.102
(0.174) (0.124)
Distance3 0.577 0.353
(0.366) (0.257)
Distance4 -0.554** -0.369**
(0.250) (0.174)
Circuit Fixed Effects Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y
N 10043 10043
R-sq 0.111 0.088
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the circuit-year level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01). Data on cases comes from OpenJurist (1950-2007). Ideology scores come from the Judicial
Common Space database. The main independent variable is (the absolute value of) ideology score
demeaned by the center of the pool of judges available to be assigned in a Circuit-year. The dependent
variable is the judge’s dissent rate (column 1) or concurrence rate (column 2) in a Circuit-year. Fixed
effects include year and circuit. Observations are weighted by the number of votes cast by the judge in the
Circuit-year.
Appendix Table A.4 controls for biographical characteristics of the judge. These are controlled as dummy
indicators for party of appointment, whether the judge and appointing president were of the same or
different political parties, whether government (Congress and president) was unified or divided at the time
of appointment, whether the judge was Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Catholic,
Jewish, or non-religious, whether the judge was Black, non-white, or female, whether the judge received a
law degree from a public institution, a bachelor’s degree from a public institution, a bachelor’s degree from
within the state of appointment, or obtained further graduate studies in law (LLM or SJD), was born in
the 1910s, 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, or 1950s, had previous experience as federal district judge, law professor,
U.S. attorney, assistant U.S. attorney, Solicitor-General, mayor, state governor, Attorney-General, Deputy
or assistant district/county/city attorney, Bankruptcy judge, U.S. Magistrate, Congressional counsel,
District/County/City Attorney, Local/municipal court judge, Sub-cabinet secretary, Cabinet secretary,
Special prosecutor, State lower court judge, State high court judge, or Local/municipal court judge, or had
experience in City council, Department of Justice, Solicitor-General’s office, or served as a member of the
State house, State senate, U.S. House of Representatives, or had previous experience in private practice, in
government, or in other federal capacity, and if the judge was elevated from the district courts, the party of
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the president who made the district bench appointment, and receiving an exceptional rating from the
American Bar Association.
APPENDIX TABLE A.4
Dissent and Ideology Score of Judge Relative to Center of Judge Pool
(1) (2)
Dissent Concur
Distance to Center of Judge Pool 0.0459*** 0.0288***
(0.00784) (0.00586)
Distance2 -0.0403*** -0.0324***
(0.0125) (0.00886)
Judge Characteristics Y Y
Circuit Fixed Effects Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y
N 8692 8692
R-sq 0.183 0.173
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the circuit-year level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01). Data on cases comes from OpenJurist (1950-2007). Ideology scores come from the Judicial
Common Space database. Judicial characteristics come from Federal Judiciary Center/Attributes of U.S.
Federal Judges Database and controlled for as binary indicators. The main independent variable is (the
absolute value of) ideology score demeaned by the center of the pool of judges available to be assigned in a
Circuit-year. The dependent variable is the judge’s dissent rate (column 1) or concurrence rate (column 2)
in a Circuit-year. Fixed effects include year and circuit. Observations are weighted by the number of votes
cast by the judge in the Circuit-year.
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Appendix Figure A.7.— Dissent and Ideology Score of Judge Relative to Center of
Judge Pool – predicted pattern
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Notes: x-axis: Ideology scores are demeaned by the center of the pool of judges available to be assigned in a
Circuit-year. The x-axis is divided into 15 evenly-spaced bins (the number denotes the midpoint of the bin)
from left-to-right in ideology space, where relatively more conservative scores are along the right on the
x-axis. y-axis: Predicted dissent rate (from Appendix Table A.3 column 1) in a Circuit-year. Average of
predicted dissent rate is displayed on the y-axis for each bin. The average is a weighted average to account
for the number of times the judge actually appeared on cases in that Circuit-year. Data on cases comes
from OpenJurist (1950-2007). Ideology scores come from the Judicial Common Space database.
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Appendix Table A.5 presents the main specification but splits the sample according to whether the
decision affirmed the lower court opinion. The sample size differs slightly when there are no affirmances or
all affirmances for a judges in a Circuit-year.
APPENDIX TABLE A.5
Robustness to Splitting the Sample by Affirmance
Distance to Center of Judge Pool 0.0760*** 0.0522***
(0.0109) (0.0136)
Distance2 -0.0750*** -0.0495**
(0.0167) (0.0215)
Circuit Fixed Effects Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y
Sample Affirmed Not Affirmed
N 9577 9622
R-sq 0.091 0.072
(1) (2) 
Dissent or Concur
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the circuit-year level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01). Data on cases comes from OpenJurist (1950-2007). Ideology scores come from the Judicial
Common Space database. The main independent variable is Ideology score demeaned by the center of the
pool of judges available to be assigned in a Circuit-year. Column 1 uses only the sample of decisions that
affirmed the lower court opinion and Column 2 uses only the sample of decisions that did not. The
dependent variable is the judge’s sum of dissent rate and concurrence rate in this Circuit-year. Fixed effects
include year and circuit. Observations are weighted by the number of votes cast by the judge in the sample
of cases in the Circuit-year.
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B.4 Robustness for Fact 3
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Appendix Figure A.8.— Ideology of Vote and Ideology Score of Judge Relative to Center
of Judge Pool – predicted pattern
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Notes: x-axis: Ideology scores of a judge demeaned by the center of the pool of judges available to be
assigned in a Circuit-year. The x-axis is divided into 15 evenly-spaced bins (the number denotes the
midpoint of the bin) from left-to-right in ideology space, where more conservative scores are along the right
on the x-axis. y-axis: Predicted vote ideology, demeaned to be centered at zero. The predicted value is
obtained using Table IV column 1, where the dependent variable is ideology of a vote, which is coded as 1
for conservative, 0 for mixed or not applicable, and -1 for liberal. Average of predicted ideology of votes is
displayed on the y-axis for each bin. The dashed lines depict the 95% confidence interval. Data comes from
the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Project (1925-2002 5% Sample).
We check if the S-shape is present using lifetime average values for judges. Appendix Table A.6
Column 1 shows that the cubic term is still negative and significant when using the Score Relative to
Center of Judge Pool. Column 2 shows that the cubic term is neither negative nor significant when using
the judge’s own ideology score implying that the results are driven by ideological disagreement rather than
ideology per se.
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APPENDIX TABLE A.6
Ideology of Vote and Ideology Score Relative to Center of Judge Pool
(1) (2)
   Vote Ideology 
Score Relative to Center of Judge Pool 0.217***
  Lifetime average (0.0443)
Relative Score2 0.0557
(0.0860)
Relative Score3 -0.489**
(0.166)
Score 0.141**
(0.0528)
Score2 0.0788
(0.114)
Score3 0.145
(0.262)
N 421 421
R-sq 0.056 0.112
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the circuit level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p
< 0.01). Data on cases comes from the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Project (1925-2002 5% Sample).
Ideology scores come from the Judicial Common Space database. Main independent variables are Ideology
scores demeaned by the center of the pool of judges available to be assigned in a Circuit-year and averaged
over a judge’s career in column 1 or, as placebo, not demeaned in column 2. Sample includes three-judge
panels where there are no tied or missing scores. The dependent variable is lifetime-average ideology of vote
(each vote is coded as 1 for conservative, 0 for mixed or not applicable, and -1 for liberal). Regression
weights are the number of votes cast over a judge’s career. Vote is the vote of the judge.
We next check if the S-shape is present when using quartic terms. Appendix Table A.7 reports the
regression coefficients. Appendix Figure A.9 shows the predicted values when using Score Relative to
Center of Judge Pool.
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APPENDIX TABLE A.7
Ideology of Vote and Ideology Score of Judge Relative to Center of Judge Pool
(1) (2)
   Vote Ideology 
Score Relative to Center of Judge Pool 0.170***
(0.0331)
Relative Score2 0.175
(0.138)
Relative Score3 -0.317**
(0.142)
Relative Score4 -0.278
(0.262)
Score 0.179***
(0.0444)
Score2 0.481***
(0.177)
Score3 -0.0646
(0.188)
Score4 -1.231**
(0.512)
N 23031 23031
R-sq 0.002 0.005
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the circuit-year level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01). Data on cases comes from the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Project (1925-2002 5% Sample).
Ideology scores come from the Judicial Common Space database. Main independent variables are Ideology
scores demeaned by the center of the pool of judges available to be assigned in a Circuit-year and averaged
over a judge’s career in column 1 or, as placebo, not demeaned in column 2. Sample includes three-judge
panels where there are no tied or missing scores. The dependent variable is ideology of a vote, which is
coded as 1 for conservative, 0 for mixed or not applicable, and -1 for liberal. Vote is the vote of the judge.
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Appendix Figure A.9.— Ideology of Vote and Ideology Score of Judge Relative to Center
of Judge Pool – predicted pattern from quartic regression
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Notes: Data comes from the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Project (1925-2002 5% Sample). Predicted
ideology of vote (from Table A.7 column 1) is plotted for evenly spaced bins of ideology score (demeaned
by the center of the judge pool) from left to right. The dependent variable is ideology of a vote, which is
coded as 1 for conservative, 0 for mixed or not applicable, and -1 for liberal. Average of predicted ideology
of votes is displayed for each bin.
We next check if the S-shape in the voting pattern is present when splitting the sample according to
whether the decision affirmed the lower court opinion. Appendix Table A.8 reports the regression coefficients.
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APPENDIX TABLE A.8
Ideology of Vote and Ideology Score of Judge Relative to Center of Judge Pool, split
sample
Score Relative to Center of Judge Pool 0.148*** 0.190***
(0.0384) (0.0483)
Score
2 0.128* 0.0298
(0.0750) (0.0967)
Score
3 -0.387** -0.346*
(0.163) (0.199)
Sample Affirmed Not Affirmed
N 12918 10113
R-sq 0.001 0.002
(1) (2) 
Vote Ideology
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the circuit-year level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01). Data on cases comes from the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Project (1925-2002 5%
Sample). Ideology scores come from the Judicial Common Space database. The main independent variable
is ideology score demeaned by the center of the pool of judges available to be assigned in a Circuit-year.
Sample includes three-judge panels where there are no tied or missing scores. The dependent variable is
ideology of vote, which is coded as 1 for conservative, 0 for mixed or not applicable, and -1 for liberal.
Column 1 restricts to sample of cases that affirmed the lower court opinion and column 2 restricts to cases
that did not.
Finally, we show that the result disappears when considering judge scores which are not relative to
the pool (Table IV column 2 and a visualization in Appendix Figure A.10). Hence, what is important is that
a judge is ideologically extreme relative to her peers—it is not about extreme ideology per se, but about
the interaction between peers who disagree ideologically. This result is robust also to quartic terms and life
voting (see the second columns in Tables A.7 and A.6).
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Appendix Figure A.10.— Ideology of Vote and (non-relative) Ideology Score – predicted
pattern
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Notes: Predicted ideology of vote is plotted for evenly spaced bins of (non-demeaned) ideology score from
left to right. The predicted value is obtained using Table IV column 2, where the dependent variable is
ideology of a vote, which is coded as 1 for conservative, 0 for mixed or not applicable, and -1 for liberal.
Average of predicted ideology of votes is displayed on the y-axis for each bin. Data comes from the U.S.
Courts of Appeals Database Project (1925-2002 5% Sample).
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B.5 Robustness regarding retired judgesAppendix Figure A.11 shows that age and experience vary
smoothly at the time of retirement.
Appendix Figure A.11.— Age and Experience at Retirement
Graph 1/29/16, 8:01 PM
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Notes: Each dot represents the average age (left panel) or experience (right panel) of judges with the same
number of years relative to retirement. Data comes from biographical data on judges (1950-2007).
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Appendix Figure A.12 shows that the relationship between rate of dissent or concurrence and ide-
ology score among retired judges does not appear to be driven by outliers.
Appendix Figure A.12.— Retired Judges: Dissent or Concurrence and Ideological Dis-
tance
Graph 1/23/16, 5:32 PM
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Notes: Rates of dissent or concurrence are calculated at the Circuit-year level. Each dot represents the
average yearly sum of dissent rate and concurrence rate for retired judges sharing a similar score. The
average is a weighted average to account for the number of times the judge actually appeared on cases in
that Circuit-year. On the left panel, the score is ideological distance to the center of the judge pool and on
the right panel, the score is ideological distance to the Supreme Court. Data on cases comes from
OpenJurist (1950-2007).
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C Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose by negation that type t has a strategy that violates the conditions of the proposition, i.e.,
there is not a cutoff strategy. Suppose first that at least on one side of t there are both opinions that t
signs and opinions that she dissents against, and without loss of generality suppose that the violation of the
conditions of the proposition happens on her left side (where t is not necessarily larger than 0). Thus, to the
left of t, there must exist two non-overlapping ranges ∆vs and ∆vd such that (1) t signs all opinions at ∆vs
and dissents against all opinions at ∆vd; (2) max {|t− v| s.t. v ∈ ∆vd} < min {|t− v| s.t. v ∈ ∆vs}; and (3)´
∆vs
2F (v) f (v) dv =
´
∆vd
2F (v) f (v) dv. Condition (1) is just a definition of the two ranges; condition (2)
states that there are opinions that t dissents against and yet are closer to her compared to other opinions she
signs, and this is satisfied because any strategy that is not a cutoff strategy as described in the proposition
must contain two such ranges; condition (3) equates the probability of the events of having an opinion at
∆vs and at ∆vd, and this can always be satisfied by cutting down the region that initially corresponds to a
more likely event until both events have equal probabilities. Conditions (2) and (3) together imply that by
switching her strategy to signing all opinions at ∆vd and dissenting against all opinions at ∆vs, judge t can
strictly decrease her D cost without changing W . Thus this supposed strategy cannot be her optimal one.
Finally, the only non-degenerate strategy that violates the conditions of the proposition and such that, on
any side of her, t either always signs the opinion or always dissents against it is a strategy in which t signs v
iff t ≥ v or iff t ≤ v. In this case we can still require that ranges ∆vs and ∆vd satisfy conditions (1) and (2),
and replace condition (3) with an equivalent one. Without loss of generality, suppose that t signs v iff t ≥ v.
Then replace condition (3) with condition (3’) as follows:
´
∆vs
2F (v) f (v) dv =
´
∆vd
2F (1− v) f (v) dv. The
rest of the proof stays the same – by switching her strategy to signing all opinions at ∆vd and dissenting
against all opinions at ∆vs, judge t can strictly decrease her D cost without changing W and so this strategy
cannot be her optimal one.
D Proof of Proposition 2
The proposition is proven:
• For α > 1/2 in Section D.2.
• For α < 1/2 in Section D.3.
• For α = 1/2 in Section D.4.
Before we get to these parts we will show some useful first properties of the model. Let the distribution of
judges be single-peaked and symmetric around 0 and w.l.o.g consider judge t ≥ 0.
For a cutoff strategy c of judge t, the following probabilities are instrumental for calculating the
judge’s loss. The probability that t is the median is
(6) Pm ≡ 2F (t) [1− F (t)] .
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The probability that the opinion is more than c away from t is
(7) P (t) = [F (t− c)]2 + [1− F (t+ c)]2 .
The pattern of a spider is defined as follows.
Definition 1 A spider pattern is when P (t) is first increasing and then decreasing.
Here is a first useful lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose the cutoff c is constant at a certain range of types and for each type t at this range
c < 1− t. Then the probability of dissent is increasing in t in that range.
Proof: Differentiating P (t) and using the properties of a uniform distribution yields
P ′(t) = 2 {F (t− c)f(t− c)− [1− F (t+ c)] f(t+ c)} ≥ 0,
because symmetry implies that F (t−c) ≥ [1− F (t+ c)] and single-peaked distribution implies that f(t−c) ≥
f(t+ c). Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 Let α > 0. At the range 1− t < c < 1+ t, the probability of dissent decreases if and only if dcdt > 1
(when dcdt is well defined).
Proof: Noting that 1− t ≤ c, hence the dissent occurs only for opinions to the left of t, we get that
P ′(t) = 2F (t− c)f(t− c)
(
1− dc
dt
)
− 2 [1− F (t+ c)] f(t+ c)
(
1 +
dc
dt
)
=
1
2
(1 + t− c)
(
1− dc
dt
)
, when t ∼ U (−1, 1)
i.e., P ′(t) < 0 iff dcdt > 1. Q.E.D.
D.1 Analyzing L (c) Denoting
(8) z ≡
tˆ
t−c
(t− v)2F (v)f(v)dv +
t+cˆ
t
(v − t)2 [1− F (v)] f(v)dv,
we can express the loss of judge t with cutoff strategy c as follows
(9) L(c) =
 tˆ
t−c
(t− v) 2F (v) f (v) dv +
t+cˆ
t
(v − t) 2 (1− F (v)) f (v) dv
α +WP (t) = zα +WP (t)
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Differentiating by c yields
dL
dc
= αzα−1
dz
dc
+W
dP (t)
dc
→
dL
dc
= 2cMαzα−1 − 2WM = 2M [cαzα−1 −W ] ,(10)
where
(11) M ≡ F (t− c)f(t− c) + [1− F (t+ c)] f(t+ c).
M is positive since F ∈ [0, 1] and f ≥ 0.
Let the distribution of judges be U (−1, 1), so that f(t) = 0.5, F (t) = 1+t2 . Then, for t ≥ 0, we have
three possible regions for c:
D.1.1 Case 1: c ≥ 1 + t
z =
1
2
 tˆ
−1
(t− v) (1 + v) dv +
1ˆ
t
(v − t) (1− v) dv
 = ...
z =
1
2
[
t2 +
1
3
]
(12)
Note that M = 0 (in 11) since F (t− c) = f(t+ c) = 0 under a uniform distribution c ≥ 1 + t. Hence (from
(10))
dL
dc
= 0.
D.1.2 Case 2: 1− t ≤ c < 1 + t
z =
tˆ
t−c
(t− v) 2F (v) f (v) dv +
1ˆ
t
(v − t) 2 (1− F (v)) f (v) dv
=
tˆ
t−c
(t− v) 1 + v
2
dv +
1ˆ
t
(v − t) 1− v
2
dv = ...
=
1
2
[
(t− c)3
3
− (t− 1)(t− c)
2
2
+
(
c− 1
2
)
t+
1
6
]
⇒ dL
dc
= 2M
αc(1
2
[
(t− c)3
3
− (t− 1)(t− c)
2
2
+
(
c− 1
2
)
t+
1
6
])α−1
−W
 .
Substituting
M =
1
2
[
1 + t− c
2
]
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into dLdc yields
(13)
dL
dc
=
(
1 + t− c
2
)21−ααc[ (t− c)3
3
− (t− 1)(t− c)
2
2
+
(
c− 1
2
)
t+
1
6
]α−1
−W
 .
We will interchangeably use different formulations for z:
2z =
(t− c)3
3
− (t− 1)(t− c)
2
2
+
(
c− 1
2
)
t+
1
6
= ...(14)
2z = −1
3
c3 − 1
6
t3 +
1
2
tc2 +
1
2
t2 +
1
2
c2 − 1
2
t+
1
6
= ...(15)
2z =
1
6
(1− t)3 − 1
3
c3 +
1
2
tc2 +
1
2
c2.(16)
D.1.3 Case 3: c ≤ 1− t
z =
tˆ
t−c
(t− v) 2F (v) f (v) dv +
t+cˆ
t
(v − t) 2 (1− F (v)) f (v) dv
=
tˆ
t−c
(t− v) 1 + v
2
dv +
t+cˆ
t
(v − t) 1− v
2
dv = ...
= c2
[
1
2
− 1
3
c
]
⇒ dL
dc
= 2M
[
αc
(
c2
[
1
2
− 1
3
c
])α−1
−W
]
(17)
= 2M
[
αc2α−1
[
1
2
− 1
3
c
]α−1
−W
]
.
Using the uniform distribution in equation (11) for M
M =
1
2
[
1 + t− c
2
+
1− t− c
2
]
=
1
2
(1− c)
and substituting into (17) yields
(18)
dL
dc
= (1− c)
[
αc2α−1
[
1
2
− 1
3
c
]α−1
−W
]
,
(19) lim
c→0
dL
dc
=

+∞ if α < 1/2
2−1/2 −W if α = 1/2
−W if α > 1/2
.
Lemma 5 dLdc is continuous everywhere.
Proof: It is immediate that L is continuous within each range so we only need to check the transitions.
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At c = 1− t:
dL
dc
=
(
1 + t− c
2
)21−ααc[ (t− c)3
3
− (t− 1)(t− c)
2
2
+
(
c− 1
2
)
t+
1
6
]α−1
−W

= (1− c)
(
21−ααc
[
−2
3
c3 + c2
]α−1
−W
)
= (1− c)
(
21−ααc2α−1
[
1− 2
3
c3
]α−1
−W
)
= (1− c)
[
αc2α−1
[
1
2
− 1
3
c
]α−1
−W
]
which equals dL/dc at case 3 (see equation 18). At c = 1 + t:
dL
dc
=
(
1 + t− c
2
)21−ααc[ (t− c)3
3
− (t− 1)(t− c)
2
2
+
(
c− 1
2
)
t+
1
6
]α−1
−W
 = 0
which equals dL/dc at case 1 (see equation 18). Q.E.D.
D.1.4 Analyzing dL/dc In order to investigate dLdc , define the function g(c, t) as follows:
(20) g(c, t) ≡
 c2α−1
[
1− 23c
]α−1 if 0 < c < 1− t
c
[− 13c3 − 16 t3 + 12 tc2 + 12 t2 + 12c2 − 12 t+ 16]α−1 if 1− t ≤ c ≤ 1 + t .
Lemma 6 The sign of dLdc equals the sign of 2
1−ααg(c, t)−W .
Proof: Follows immediately from substituting the values of g(c, t) for the ranges 0 < c < 1 − t and
1− t ≤ c < 1 + t in the corresponding expressions of dLdc . Q.E.D.
Lemma 7 The sign of ∂g(c,t)∂c is determined by the sign of
(21) E ≡

[
2α(1− c)− 1 + 43c
]
if 0 < c < 1− t[
2
3c
3 − 16 t3 − 12 tc2 + 12 t2 − 12c2 − 12 t+ 16 + α
(
tc2 + c2 − c3)] if 1− t ≤ c < 1 + t .
Proof: Note that g(c, t) is continuous (since g is part of dL/dc which is continuous by Lemma 5) and
∂g(c, t)
∂c
=
∂
∂c
 c2α−1
[
1− 23c
]α−1 if 0 < c < 1− t
c
[− 13c3 − 16 t3 + 12 tc2 + 12 t2 + 12c2 − 12 t+ 16]α−1 if 1− t ≤ c < 1 + t = ...
∂g(c, t)
∂c
=

c2α−2
[
2α(1− c)− 1 + 43c
] [
1− 23c
]α−2 if 0 < c < 1− t[
2
3c
3 − 16 t3 − 12 tc2 + 12 t2 − 12c2 − 12 t+ 16 + α
(
tc2 + c2 − c3)] ∗[
1
6 (1− t)3 − 13c3 + 12 tc2 + 12c2
]α−2
if 1− t ≤ c < 1 + t
(22)
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Note first that
[
1− 23c
] ≥ 0 when 0 < c < 1−t. Then note from equation (16) that [ 16 (1− t)3 − 13c3 + 12 tc2 + 12c2] =
2z ≥ 0 (since z by definition (8) is a sum of two positive integrals). Thus, the sign of ∂g(c,t)∂c is solely deter-
mined by
E =

[
2α(1− c)− 1 + 43c
]
if 0 < c < 1− t[
2
3c
3 − 16 t3 − 12 tc2 + 12 t2 − 12c2 − 12 t+ 16 + α
(
tc2 + c2 − c3)] if 1− t ≤ c < 1 + t .
Q.E.D.
D.2 Convexity, linearity and weak concavity α > 12 This case is divided into three subcases which
are proven:
• For α ≥ 1 in Section D.2.1.
• For 2/3 ≤ α < 1 in Section D.2.2.
• For 1/2 < α < 2/3 in Section D.2.3.
But we start with presenting some useful results.
When α > 12 we have limc→0
dL
dc < 0, implying that c = 0 is not a potential solution. Every type has
either an inner solution or chooses the corner solution of no dissent (c = 1 + t).
For α = 12 equation (21) yields
E =

1
3c if 0 < c < 1− t
1
6
[
c3 + (1− t)3
]
if 1− t ≤ c < 1 + t
which is strictly positive. It then follows, given that E increases in α at the range 1− t ≤ c < 1 + t,37 that
for any α ≥ 12 , ∂g(c,t)∂c is positive and hence g(c, t) increases in c at the whole range for which it is defined,
hence equals W21−αα at most once. Hence L(c) has at most one inner local min point (where
dL
dc = 0).
Corollary 1 Let α > 12 . Type t chooses c = 1 + t if W ≥ α21−αg (1 + t, t), and otherwise she has an
inner solution c ∈ ]0, 1 + t[.
Proof: We know from Lemma 5. IfW ≥ α21−αg (c, t) at c = 1+t then L′ never equals zero, hence no inner
solution. IfW < α21−αg (1 + t, t) then she has an inner solution since L′ (1 + t) > 0 and since limc→0 L′ < 0.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 8 Let α ≥ 12 . Suppose that some type t′ has an inner solution c (t′) ≤ 1 − t′. Then any t < t′ has
an inner solution c (t) = c (t′) ≤ 1− t′ too.
37Since
(
tc2 + c2 − c3) = c2 (1 + t− c) > 0 when c < 1 + t.
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Proof: Lemma 6 implies that, in inner solutions, W = α21−αg (c (t′) , t′) . For any t < t′ we have g (c, t) =
g (c, t′) at the range c ∈ [0, 1− t′], henceW = α21−αg (c (t′) , t) where c (t′) ≤ 1− t′ implies that c (t′) < 1− t.
In other words, t has an inner solution at c (t′) as well. Q.E.D.
Lemma 9 Let
h (t) ≡ g(1 + t, t) = (1 + t)
(
1
3
+ t2
)α−1
.
Then h (t) is monotonically increasing if α ≥ 23 but has a unique max point at
(23) tmax ≡
1− α−
√(
α− 2)(α− 23
)
2α− 1
if α ∈ ] 12 , 23[.
Proof:
dh
dt
=
(
1
3
+ t2
)α−1
+ 2t (α− 1) (1 + t)
(
1
3
+ t2
)α−2
= ...
=
[
(2α− 1) t2 + 2 (α− 1) t+ 1
3
](
1
3
+ t2
)α−2
(24)
which is positive if α ≥ 1. For 1/2 < α < 1 note that the bracket determines the sign, it is U-shaped in t
and switches sign for t such that
(2α− 1) t2 + 2 (α− 1) t+ 1
3
= 0
t1,2 =
−2 (α− 1)±
√
4 (α− 1)2 − 4 13 (2α− 1)
2 (2α− 1)
=
1− α±
√(
α− 2)(α− 23
)
2α− 1 .
which has no real solution, and hence the bracket is strictly positive, if α ∈ [ 23 , 2]. Hence dhdt ≥ 0. Otherwise,
if α ∈ ] 12 , 23[, we first note that
α <
2
3
⇒ 1− α > 2α− 1⇒ t1 > 1,
meaning that the bracket crosses the zero-line at most once for t ∈ [0, 1]. It crosses it exactly once if there
exists a t ∈ [0, 1] for which dhdt < 0:
1− α−
√(
α− 2)(α− 23
)
2α− 1 < 1⇔
(2α− 1)
(
α− 2
3
)
< 0
69
which indeed holds when α ∈ ] 12 , 23[. Finally, noting that
1− α−
√(
α− 2)(α− 23
)
2α− 1 > 0⇔
α >
1
2
,
we get that, for any α ∈ ] 12 , 23[, h (t) has a max point at t2 = 1−α−
√
(α−2)(α− 23 )
2α−1 ≡ tmax, while dhdt > 0
∀t ∈ [0, 1] if α ≥ 23 . Q.E.D.
Lemma 10 Let α ≥ 23 . A necessary condition for getting the pattern of a spider is to have a range of types
[t
¯
, 1] with cutoffs c ∈ [1− t, 1 + t] and such that among them the probability of dissent is decreasing in t.
Proof: Corollary (19) implies a type has an inner solution iff W < α21−αg (1 + t, t). Lemma 9 says that,
when α ≥ 23 , h (t) ≡ g (1 + t, t) is monotonically increasing. Hence if some type t′ has an inner solution c,
then any type t > t′ has an inner solution too. If W is sufficiently large so that no type has an inner solution,
it follows that no type ever dissents, and this is a degenerate case with no spider. Otherwise, the pattern of
a spider requires that among types with sufficiently large t the probability of dissent will be decreasing. To
complete the proof, we will show that a decrease in dissent cannot happen if the inner solutions are such
that c (t) < 1 − t. To see that, note that if a given type t′′ has an inner solution c (t′′) = c˜ < 1 − t′′, then
it must be that all types t < t′′ have c (t) = c˜ as their solution too, because ∀t ≤ t′′ we have c˜ < 1 − t and
because the part of g(c, t) at the range c ∈ [0, 1− t′′] is identical for all these types (see equation 20 in the
first range). This implies by Lemma 3 that at the range t ∈ [0, t′′] the probability of dissent is increasing in
t. Hence, a necessary condition for getting the pattern of a spider is a decrease in the probability of dissent
among a range of types whose cutoffs are such that 1− t < c < 1 + t. Q.E.D.
Lemma 11 Let α > 12 and suppose there exists a range of types with inner solutions c ∈ [1− t, 1 + t]. Then,
in this range of inner solutions, dcdt ≤ 0 if and only if α ≥ 1
Proof: For type t with an inner solution at 1− t < c < 1 + t the first order condition (13) must hold:
21−ααc
[
(t− c)3
3
− (t− 1)(t− c)
2
2
+
(
c− 1
2
)
t+
1
6
]α−1
−W = 0.
Using the implicit function theorem we get
dc
dt
= −
d
dtc
[− 13c3 − 16 t3 + 12 tc2 + 12 t2 + 12c2 − 12 t+ 16]α−1
d
dcc
[− 13c3 − 16 t3 + 12 tc2 + 12 t2 + 12c2 − 12 t+ 16]α−1 → ...
dc
dt
= c
(1− α) [− 12 t2 + 12c2 + t− 12]
2
3c
3 − 16 t3 − 12 tc2 + 12 t2 − 12c2 − 12 t+ 16 + α (tc2 + c2 − c3)
.(25)
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Since we look at the case of α > 12 , and noting that
tc2 + c2 − c3 = c2 (t+ 1− c) > 0,
it is enough to show that
[
2
3c
3 − 16 t3 − 12 tc2 + 12 t2 − 12c2 − 12 t+ 16 + α
(
tc2 + c2 − c3)] is positive at α = 12
(since the expression increases in α)38 in order to conclude that the denominator is positive. Indeed, this
expression with α = 1/2 can be shown to equal 16
[
c3 + (1− t)3
]
> 0. It thus follows that for α ∈ ] 12 , 1[ the
sign of dcdt equals the sign of − 12 t2 + 12c2 + t− 12 while for α > 1 the sign of dcdt is the opposite of the sign of
− 12 t2 + 12c2 + t− 12 :
−1
2
t2 +
1
2
c2 + t− 1
2
≥ −1
2
t2 +
1
2
(1− t)2 + t− 1
2
= ...(26)
= −1
2
t2 +
1
2
− t+ 1
2
t2 + t− 1
2
= 0.
It thus follows that dcdt ≤ 0 if α ≥ 1 and dcdt > if α ∈]1/2, 1[. Q.E.D.
Lemma 12 Suppose there exists a range of types with inner solutions c ∈ [1− t, 1 + t]. Then dcdt > 1 iff
(27) G ≡ c2 [(3α− 1) c− (2α− 1) 3 (1 + t)]− (1− t)2 [(1− t) + (1− α) 3c] > 0.
Proof: Using dcdt from (25),
dc
dt > 1 holds iff
c
(1− α) [− 12 t2 + 12c2 + t− 12]
2
3c
3 − 16 t3 − 12 tc2 + 12 t2 − 12c2 − 12 t+ 16 + α (tc2 + c2 − c3)
> 1⇔ ...
c2 [(3α− 1) c− (2α− 1) 3 (1 + t)]− (1− t)2 [(1− t) + (1− α) 3c] > 0.
Q.E.D.
D.2.1 Convexity and linearity α ≥ 1
Proposition 6 There cannot be a spider pattern when α ≥ 1
Proof: Lemma 10 implies that a necessary condition for getting the pattern of a spider is a decrease in
the probability of dissent at the range 1 − t < c < 1 + t. It thus follows from Lemmas 11 and 4 that there
cannot be a spider when α ≥ 1. Q.E.D.
D.2.2 Very weak concavity α ∈ [ 23 , 1[
Proposition 7 There cannot be a spider pattern when α ∈ [ 23 , 1[.
Proof: Lemma 10 implies that a necessary condition for getting the pattern of a spider is a decrease in
the probability of dissent at the range 1 − t < c < 1 + t, which together with Lemma 4 implies that G
38Since
(
tc2 + c2 − c3) = c2 (1 + t− c) > 0 when c < 1 + t.
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(defined in equation (27)) must be strictly positive somewhere in the range to maintain the possibility of
a spider. Investigating G, note first that if [(3α− 1) c− (2α− 1) 3 (1 + t)] ≤ 0 then G ≤ 0. Otherwise, if
[(3α− 1) c− (2α− 1) 3 (1 + t)] > 0, then it gets its max value for c = 1 + t, while the part that is deducted
from it, (1− t)2 [(1− t) + (1− α) 3c], is positive and increases in c hence is minimal when c = 1 − t. By
plugging these values correspondingly we get that
G < (1 + t)
3
[2− 3α]− (1− t)3 [4− 3α] ≤ 0,
when α ∈ [ 23 , 1[. Hence there cannot be a spider pattern. Q.E.D.
D.2.3 Mildly weak concavity α ∈ ] 12 , 23[ We will show that for any α ∈ ] 12 , 23[ the following pattern of
spider exists (though other kinds of spider can be generated too: most types, including those close to 0 and
1, never dissent, while there exists a non-empty range of types in-between that do dissent sometimes.
Proposition 8 For any α ∈ ] 12 , 23[, there exist values of W for which dissent has the pattern of a spider
Proof: From Lemma 9 we know that h(t) = g (1 + t, t) has a hill-shape for any α ∈ ] 12 , 23[ with a peak at
tmax (defined in equation (23)). We will prove the proposition for W = α21−α [g (1 + tmax, tmax)− ε], where
ε is very small. In this case, since W < α21−αg (1 + tmax, tmax), Corollary 1 says inner solutions exist for a
small range of types t ∈ (tmax − δ1, tmax + δ2), with c very close to 1 + tmax. For a given α, they also depend
on ε as a parameter. From corollary 1, we know that all other types, including those close to 0 or close to 1,
choose a corner solution c = 1+t (always dissent). To get the pattern of a spider we need to verify that at the
range of inner solutions the probability of dissent is either monotonic or first increases and then decreases.
Given W has been set such that type t = 0 has a corner solution, Lemma 8 implies that any type t in the
range of types with inner solutions has a solution at the range c ∈ [1− t, 1 + t] . In this range, we know from
Lemma 4 that the probability of dissent decreases if and only if dcdt > 1.
Let us denote the inner min point of L (c) for type t ∈ (tmax − δ1, tmax + δ2) by c0 (t; ε). Then we
can expand c0 (t; ε) into Taylor series in ε and t around ε = 0 and t = tmax as follows:
(28) ∆c ≡ c0 (t; ε)− (1 + tmax) =
(
∂c0
∂t
)
ε=0
t=tmax
∆t+
1
2
(
∂2c0
∂t2
)
ε=0
t=tmax
(∆t)
2
+
(
∂c0
∂ε
)
ε=0
t=tmax
ε+ ...,
where ∆t ≡ t− tmax. We know, since tmax is the peak of h (t), that at tmax and c = 1 + tmax we have
dh
dt
=
∂g(c, t)
∂t
+
∂g(c, t)
∂c
d
dt
(1 + t) =
∂g(c, t)
∂t
+
∂g(c, t)
∂c
= 0,
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hence at tmax we have (from the implicit function theorem)
(29)
(
∂c0
∂t
)
ε=0
t=tmax
= −
[
∂g(c, t)
∂t
]
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
/
[
∂g(c, t)
∂c
]
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
= 1.
To find the other derivatives in equation (28) we will expand into series the defining equation
g(c0 (t) , t)− g(1 + tmax, tmax) = −ε.
The expansion will be(
∂g
∂t
)
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
∆t+
(
∂g
∂c
)
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
∆c+
1
2
(
∂2g
∂t2
(∆t)
2
+ 2
∂2g
∂t∂c
(∆t) (∆c) +
∂2g
∂c2
(∆c)
2
)
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
+ ...
=
(
∂g
∂t
)
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
∆t+
(
∂g
∂c
)
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
[
∆t+
1
2
(
∂2c0
∂t2
)
ε=0
t=tmax
(∆t)
2
+
(
∂c0
∂ε
)
ε=0
t=tmax
ε
]
+
1
2
(
∂2g
∂t2
(∆t)
2
+ 2
∂2g
∂t∂c
(∆t) (∆c) +
∂2g
∂c2
(∆c)
2
)
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
+ ...
= −ε
Equation (29) implies that ∆c ' ∆t hence we can write39
(
∂g
∂t
)
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
∆t+
(
∂g
∂c
)
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
[
∆t+
1
2
(
∂2c0
∂t2
)
ε=0
t=tmax
(∆t)
2
+
(
∂c0
∂ε
)
ε=0
t=tmax
ε
]
+
1
2
(
∂2g
∂t2
+ 2
∂2g
∂t∂c
+
∂2g
∂c2
)
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
(∆t)
2
+ ... = −ε
Given that the RHS is independent of ∆t or (∆t)2, and that the coefficient of ∆t in the LHS,
(
∂g
∂t
)
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
+
(
∂g
∂c
)
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
=
(
dh
dt
)
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
is zero, we can conclude from the coefficient of (∆t)2 that
(
∂g
∂c
)
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
(
∂2c0
∂t2
)
ε=0
t=tmax
= −
(
∂2g
∂t2
+ 2
∂2g
∂t∂c
+
∂2g
∂c2
)
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
hence
(
∂2c0
∂t2
)
ε=0
t=tmax
= −
(
∂2g
∂t2 + 2
∂2g
∂t∂c +
∂2g
∂c2
)
t=tmax
c=1+tmax(
∂g
∂c
)
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
39Note that we plug in ∆c = ∆t only in the expressions for (∆t) (∆c) and (∆c)2, where elements of size ε∆t
or ε2 in the expansion can be ignored.
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The denominator is positive because g(c, t) increases in c (even for c = 1 + t – see Lemma 14 below, which
applies to any α). The numerator is the explicit expression of
(
d2h
dt2
)
t=tmax
c=1+tmax
, which is negative given that
tmax is a max point of h (t). It thus follows that
(
∂2c0
∂t2
)
ε=0
t=tmax
> 0
hence it follows from a Taylor expansion of ∂c0∂t around tmax, using equation (29), that
(
∂c0
∂t
)
ε=0
t=tmax
= 1 +
(
∂2c0
∂t2
)
ε=0
t=tmax
∆t+ ... ≷ 1 for ∆t ≷ 0.
Hence, by Lemma 4, the dissent is first increasing and then decreasing as t passes tmax. We get a spider of
the following kind: when t goes from 0 to 1 the probability of dissent is first 0, then it jumps to some strictly
positive probability, then it first increases and then decreases, and finally the probability of dissent decreases
abruptly back to 0 and stays there. Q.E.D.
D.3 Strong concavity α < 12 This case is divided into two subcases depending on whether α is larger or
smaller than an α∗ which is defined in Section D.3.3. The proof is provided
• For α ≤ α∗ in Section D.3.4.
• For α∗ < α < 1/2 in Section D.3.4.
We start with some first useful results. When α < 12 we have by equation (19) limc→0
dL
dc = ∞, implying
that ∀t, c = 0 is a potential solution. Since dLdc is continuous everywhere, there can be an inner solution
only if dLdc = 0 more than once. In what follows we study some properties of g(c, t) before splitting the strict
concavity case into two subcases.
D.3.1 The shape of g(c, t) In this subsection we study the properties of g(c, t) as a function of c.
Lemma 13 The sign of ∂g(c,t)∂c |c−→1−t equals the sign of
∂g(c,t)
∂c |c+→1−t.
Proof: We start by revisiting Lemma 7 which showed that the sign of ∂g(c,t)∂c is solely determined by E
(defined in equation 21) which we rewrite as follows
(30) E =

[
2α(1− c)− 1 + 43c
]
if 0 < c < 1− t
c2
[(
2
3 − α
)
c+
(
α− 12
)
(1 + t)
]
+ 16 (1− t)3 if 1− t ≤ c < 1 + t
.
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Thus, the sign of ∂g(c,t)∂c |c+→1−t equals the sign of
(1− t)2
[(
2
3
− α
)
(1− t) +
(
α− 1
2
)
(1 + t)
]
+
1
6
(1− t)3 = ...
= (1− t)2
[
1
3
− 4
3
t+ 2αt
]
,
where the bracket equals E|
c
−→1−t. Hence both limits have the same sign. Q.E.D.
Lemma 14 ∂g(c,t)∂c |c−→1−t > 0.
Proof: Using Lemma 7 and equation (30) the sign of ∂g(c,t)∂c |c−→1−t equals the sign of
(1 + t)
2
[(
2
3
− α
)
(1 + t) +
(
α− 1
2
)
(1 + t)
]
+
1
6
(1− t)3
=
1
6
(1 + t)
3
+
1
6
(1− t)3 > 0
Q.E.D.
Lemma 15 ∂g(c,t)∂c has at most one local min point (with respect to c) at the range [1− t, 1 + t].
Proof: By Lemma 7 follows that ∂g(c,t)∂c has a local min point only if dE/dc = 0. Differentiating equation
(30) by c yields
(31) E′ =

4
3 − 2α if 0 < c < 1− t
c [(2− 3α) c+ (2α− 1) (1 + t)] if 1− t ≤ c < 1 + t
.
To learn the sign of ∂g(c,t)∂c throughout the range 1− t ≤ c < 1 + t, we differentiate the expression in (31) at
this range, yielding
(32) E′′ = 2 (2− 3α) c+ (2α− 1) (1 + t) > 0
Thus, equation (31) implies that for c > 0, since α < 1/2, E which by Lemma 7 determines the sign of ∂g(c,t)∂c
at the range 1− t ≤ c < 1 + t has at most one local extremum, at
(33) c =
(1− 2α) (1 + t)
2− 3α ,
and equation (32) implies that this is a min point. Q.E.D.
Lemma 16 g(c, t) does not have a local max point at 0 < c < 1− t
Proof: We know from equation (31) Lemma 7 that ∂g(c,t)∂c cannot turn from positive to negative at the
range 0 < c < 1− t (since α < 1/2), hence g(c, t) cannot have a local max point there. Q.E.D.
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Lemma 17 If cb ≡ 1−2α4
3−2α
> 1− t, then g(c, t) has a U-shape at the range [0, 1 + t]
Proof: By Lemma 7 we know ∂g(c,t)∂c = 0 when E = 0. Setting E = 0 in equation (30) yields c =
1−2α
4
3−2α
if 0 < c < 1− t
c2
[(
2
3 − α
)
c+
(
α− 12
)
(1 + t)
]
= − 16 (1− t)3 if 1− t ≤ c < 1 + t
.
Starting with the first region (c < 1 − t), we get by (21) that lim
c→0
E = 2α − 1 < 0 (when α < 1/2). Hence
(by Lemma 7) the function g (c, t) is decreasing initially. Then it keeps on decreasing until c = cb at which
∂g(c,t)
∂c = 0. Thus, if cb ≡ 1−2α4
3−2α
> 1 − t, we get that ∂g(c,t)∂c stays negative throughout the first region, and
from Lemma 13 we know that it does not change signs at c = 1 − t. Then, Lemmas 15 and 14 imply that
∂g(c,t)
∂c changes sign exactly once, from negative to positive, and so, overall, g(c, t) has a U-shape at the range
[0, 1 + t]. Q.E.D.
Lemma 18 g(c, t) may have a local max point at the range 1 − t ≤ c < 1 + t only if α ∈ [ 13 , 12] and
t ∈
[
1−α
3−5α ,
1
4−6α
]
Proof: If cb ≤ 1−t (as defined in Lemma 17), then g(c, t) has a local min point at cb and ∂g(c,t)∂c |c→−1−t ≥ 0.
In that case, Lemmas 15 and 14 imply that, at the range 1 − t ≤ c < 1 + t, it might be that g(c, t) first
increases, then decreases, and then increases again. In this case g(c, t) would have a local max point at this
range. A necessary condition for g(c, t) to have a local max point is that
cb ≤ 1− t⇒ t ≤ 1− 1− 2α4
3 − 2α
=
1
4− 6α
Moreover, the min point (c = (1−2α)(1+t)2−3α , as given by equation (33), must exist within the range [1− t, 1 + t].
Otherwise the fact that both ∂g(c,t)∂c |c→−1−t and ∂g(c,t)∂c |c→−1+t are positive would imply that g(c, t) increases
throughout the range 1−t ≤ c < 1+t and so cannot have a local max point. The condition (1−2α)(1+t)2−3α < 1+t
is indeed fulfilled, given that
1− 2α
2− 3α = 1−
1− α
2− 3α < 1
when α < 1/2. The condition (1−2α)(1+t)2−3α > 1− t can be rewritten as
(1− 2α) (1 + t) > (1− t) (2− 3α)⇔ ...
t >
1− α
3− 5α .
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For c ∈ [1− t, 1 + t] we thus get the necessary condition
1− α
3− 5α ≤
1
4− 6α ⇔ ...
⇔ α ∈
[
1
3
,
1
2
]
Q.E.D.
D.3.2 g (1 + t, t) as a function of t We now turn to study further the properties of g(c, t) at c = 1 + t,
as implied by the function h (t) defined in Lemma 9.
Lemma 19 Let α ∈ ]0, 12[. Then, as defined in Lemma 9, h (t) = g(1 + t, t) = (1 + t) ( 13 + t2)α−1 has a
unique inner global max point at tmax ≡
1−α−
√
(α−2)(α− 23 )
2α−1 .
Proof: The analysis of h (t) follows the same steps as in Lemma 9 (which was performed for the case of
α > 1/2), up to the analysis of the two roots of the square brackets in (24), which determine the sign of
h (t),
(2α− 1) t2 + 2 (α− 1) t+ 1
3
Then, when α ∈ ]0, 12[, we get that the first root t1 = 1−α+
√
(α−2)(α− 23 )
2α−1 < 0, hence h (t) has a max point at
t2 = tmax =
1−α−
√
(α−2)(α− 23 )
2α−1 if this value falls within the range [0, 1]. We thus have
1− α−
√(
α− 2)(α− 23
)
2α− 1 < 1⇔ ...
(2α− 1)
(
α− 2
3
)
> 0
which holds for any α ∈ ]0, 12[. Finally tmax > 0 iff
1− α−
√(
α− 2)(α− 23
)
2α− 1 > 0
which can be verified to hold for α < 1/2. Q.E.D.
Lemma 20 tmax ≡
1−α−
√
(α−2)(α− 23 )
2α−1 increases in α at the range α ∈
[
0, 12
[
.
77
Proof: The statement holds iff
dtmax
dα
=
d
dα
1− α−
√(
α− 2)(α− 23
)
2α− 1
 > 0
⇔ 2
(
1− α−
√(
α− 2)(α− 2
3
))
< (1− 2α)
1 + α− 4/3√(
α− 2)(α− 23
)

⇔ 2
(
(1− α)
√(
α− 2)(α− 2
3
)
− (α− 2)
(
α− 2
3
))
< (1− 2α)
(√(
α− 2)(α− 2
3
)
+ (α− 4/3)
)
⇔
√
(α− 2)
(
α− 2
3
)
< (1− 2α) (α− 4/3) + 2 (α− 2)
(
α− 2
3
)
=
4− 5α
3
.
Since both sides are positive, this amounts to proving
α2 − 8
3
α+
4
3
<
25α2 − 40α+ 16
9
⇔ 0 < 16α2 − 16α+ 4 = 4 (2α− 1)2
which is evident since α < 1/2. Q.E.D.
Lemma 21 Let α ∈ [0, 12[. Then tmax ≤ 13 .
Proof: Lemma 20 implies that tmax =
1−α−
√
(α−2)(α− 23 )
2α−1 reaches its max value for α ∈
[
0, 12
[
when α = 12 .
Using L’Hopital we get
lim
α→ 12
1− α−
√(
α− 2)(α− 23
)
2α− 1
= lim
α→ 12
−12 − 14 2α− 8/3√(α− 2)(α− 23)
 = 13
Q.E.D.
D.3.3 Splitting the strong concavity case into two subcases
Lemma 22 Let α ∈ [0, 12[ and define Ω (tmax (α) , α) ≡ α(1+tmax)1+3t2max . Then dΩ(tmax(α),α)dα > 0.
Proof: By construction (see Lemma 19) tmax is the solution to dhdt = 0. Setting equation (24) to zero and
solving for α yields
α (tmax) =
(
tmax + 1 + 2/
√
3
) (
tmax + 1− 2/
√
3
)
2tmax (1 + tmax)
.
Using this in Ω (tmax (α) , α) yields
Ω (tmax) =
(
tmax + 1 + 2/
√
3
) (
tmax + 1− 2/
√
3
)
2tmax (1 + 3t2max)
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where tmax ∈
[
2/
√
3− 1, 1/3] (the lower limit follows from substituting α = 0 in tmax = 1−α−√(α−2)(α− 23 )2α−1
while noting that tmax is increasing in α, as shown in Lemma 20, and the upper limit follows from Lemma
21, and from ). We will now show that Ω (tmax) increases in tmax, which will imply (by Lemma 20) that
Ω (tmax (α) , α) increases in α.
B (tmax) ≡ d ln Ω (tmax)
dtmax
= B1 (tmax) +B2 (tmax) +B3 (tmax) +B4 (tmax)
for
B1 (tmax) ≡ 1(
tmax + 1− 2/
√
3
) ,
B2 (tmax) ≡ 1(
tmax + 1 + 2/
√
3
) , B′2 (tmax) = −1(
tmax + 1 + 2/
√
3
)2 , B′′2 (tmax) = 2(
tmax + 1 + 2/
√
3
)3 > 0,
B3 (tmax) ≡ − 1
tmax
, B′3 (tmax) =
1
t2max
, B′′3 (tmax) = −
2
t3max
< 0,
B4 (tmax) ≡ −6tmax
(1 + 3t2max)
, B′4 (tmax) = 6
3t2max − 1
(1 + 3t2max)
2 , B
′′
4 (tmax) =
108tmax
(
1− t2max
)
(1 + 3t2max)
2 > 0.
According to the signs of the second order derivatives, and designating tlow ≡ 2/
√
3 − 1, thigh ≡ 1/3, we
have for tmax ∈ [tlow, thigh]
B2 (tmax) ≥ B2 (tlow) +B′2 (tlow) (tmax − tlow) =
√
3
4
− 3
16
(
tmax − 2/
√
3 + 1
)
B3 (tmax) ≥ B3 (tlow) + B3 (thigh)−B3 (tlow)
thigh − tlow (tmax − tlow) = −3− 2
√
3 + 3
(
3 + 2
√
3
)(
tmax − 2/
√
3 + 1
)
B4 (tmax) ≥ B4 (tlow) +B′4 (tlow) (tmax − tlow) = −
√
3/2− 3
4
(
3 + 2
√
3
)(
tmax − 2/
√
3 + 1
)
.
Let us designate z ≡ tmax−2/
√
3 + 1. Then B (tmax) ≥ N (z) = 1/z−
(
3 + 2.25
√
3
)
+
(
6.5625 + 4.5
√
3
)
z for
z ∈ [0, 4/3− 2/√3]. Since N ′ (z) < 0 for z < 4/3− 2/√3 and N (4/3− 2/√3) > 0 it follows that N (z) > 0
for all z involved, and so B (tmax) > 0 implying Ω (tmax) increases in tmax and so finally Ω (tmax (α) , α)
increases in α. Q.E.D.
Lemma 23 The functions α21−αh (tmax) and 2 (1/6)
α have one intersection point, denoted by α∗, at the
range α ∈ ]0, 12[. Furthermore we have
 α21−αh (tmax) < 2 (1/6)
α if α ∈ (0, α∗)
α21−αh (tmax) > 2 (1/6)
α if α ∈ (α∗, 12)
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Proof: Using h (t) as defined in Lemma 9 we get
α21−αh (tmax) = 2 (1/6)
α
⇔ α(1 + tmax)
(
1
6
+
1
2
t2max
)α−1
=
1
3
(1/6)
α−1
⇔ 3 (1 + 3t2max)α−1 = 1α(1 + tmax)
⇔ 3 (1 + 3t2max)α = 1 + 3t2maxα(1 + tmax)
The RHS is the inverse of Ω (tmax (α) , α) as defined in Lemma 22, and we know from that lemma that
Ω (tmax (α) , α) increases in α hence the RHS decreases in α.
Analyzing the LHS:
Let
Φ (tmax (α) , α) ≡
(
1 + 3t2max
)α
In Lemma 20 we showed that tmax increases in α. To show that Φ (tmax (α) , α) is increasing in α it is therefore
enough to show that the two partial derivatives of Φ (tmax (α) , α) with respect to its two arguments, tmax (α)
and α, are both positive.
∂Φ (tmax, α)
∂α
=
(
1 + 3t2max
)α
ln
(
1 + 3t2max
)
> 0
∂Φ (tmax, α)
∂tmax
= 6tmaxα
(
1 + 3t2max
)α−1
> 0
Thus, the LHS increases in α while the RHS decreases in α, implying that there is a unique intersection
point α∗. To find which of the functions α21−αh(tmax) and 2 (1/6)
α is larger below and above α∗ we can
plug in specific values of α. When α = 0 the former function goes to 0 (recall that h is bounded) while the
latter equals 2 hence is larger. When α −→ 12 we know from Lemma 21 that tmax approaches 13 hence the
former function approaches
1
2
21/2
4
3
(
4
9
)−1/2
=
4
3
(
9
8
)1/2
=
√
2
while the latter equals 2 (1/6)1/2 =
√
2/3 hence is smaller. This also implies α∗ ∈]0, 1/2[. Q.E.D.
We will show the pattern of a spider separately for α ∈ (0, α∗) and α ∈ (α∗, 12). The value of α∗ can
be numerically calculated to be ≈ 0.3.
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D.3.4 Very strong concavity α ∈ ]0, α∗]
Lemma 24 If α ∈ ]0, 1/3[ then g(c, t) has exactly one local min point with respect to c.
Proof: We have two cases to consider. Case i) is where cb > 1− t (cb is defined in Lemma 17). Lemma 17
then states that g (c, ·) has a U-shape, that is, exactly one local min point. Case ii) is where cb ≤ 1− t. Then
(by the proof of Lemma 17) g(c, ·) has one local min point at cb ≤ 1 − t, and ∂g(c,t)∂c |c−→1−t ≥ 0. Continuity
of ∂g(c,·)∂c at c = 1− t (see Lemma 13) then implies ∂g(c,·)∂c |c+→1−t ≥ 0. Lemma 14 states that
∂g(c,·)
∂c |c−→1+t ≥ 0.
Finally, from Lemma 18 we know that, when α < 1/3, g (c, ·) does not have a local max point in the range
c ∈ [1− t, 1 + t], hence it must be that ∂g(c,t)∂c ≥ 0 in this range. Thus, in case ii) there is one local min point.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 25 Type t has an inner solution only if h(t) > W21−αα .
Proof: We (from Lemma 24) know that g (c, t) has a U-shape for all types (because α∗ < 13 ). Remembering
(from Lemma 6) that
dL
dc
> 0⇔ g (c, t) > W
21−αα
,
and that (by equation 19)
lim
c→0
dL
dc
= +∞,
we get that in order for type t to have an inner solution it must be that h (t) = g(1 + t, t) > W21−αα . Q.E.D.
We will now show the spider for the range of W that satisfy the following conditions:
(i) t = 0 prefers c = 0 over c = 1 + t :
L (0, 0) =
1
2
W <
(
1
2
[
t2 +
1
3
])α
= L (t+ 1, 0)
W < 2 (1/6)
α
(ii) t = 1 prefers c = 1 + t over c = 0 :
L(c) = zα =
(
1
2
[
t2 +
1
3
])α
= (2/3)
α
< W
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(iii) ∀t ∈ [0, 1], dLdc |c=1+t < 0. From Lemma 6 this is equivalent to:
∀t ∈ [0, 1] , h (t) < W
21−αα
⇒ W > α21−α ∗max
t
{h (t)}
⇒ {by Lemma 19}W > α21−αh(tmax)
⇒ W > α21−α(1 + tmax)
(
1
3
+ t2max
)α−1
Lemma 26 For any α ∈ ]0, α∗] there exists a range of W that satisfy conditions (i)-(iii)
Proof: The range of W that satisfy conditions (i)-(iii) is the intersection of the range of W that satisfy
conditions (i) and (ii) and the range of W that satisfy conditions (i) and (iii) so it is enough to show that,
for any α ∈ ]0, α∗], none of these ranges is empty. Starting with conditions (i) and (ii), we note that
(2/3)
α
2 (1/6)
α =
4α
2
< 1 ∀α < 1
2
,
hence the range of W that satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) is not empty. Next, the fact that the range of W
that satisfy conditions (i) and (iii) is not empty when α < α∗ follows directly from Lemma 23. Q.E.D.
Lemma 27 If dLdc |c=1+t < 0 for type t = 0 then ∆L ≡ L(0)− L(1 + t) increases in t.
Proof: From (12) and (9) we get
∆L = L(0)− L(1 + t) = W [1− Pm]−
(
1
2
[
t2 +
1
3
])α
{by 6} = W (1− 2F (t) [1− F (t)])−
(
1
2
[
t2 +
1
3
])α
{by t ∼ U (−1, 1)} = W
[
1− 1
2
(1 + t) (1− t)
]
−
(
1
2
[
t2 +
1
3
])α
=
1
2
W
(
1 + t2
)− (1
2
[
t2 +
1
3
])α
d
dt
∆L =
[
W − α
(
1
2
[
t2 +
1
3
])α−1]
t
The term
[
W − α ( 12 [t2 + 13])α−1] increases in t (since α < 1) and at t = 0 it equals W − 6α ( 16)α. If
dL
dc |c=1+t < 0 for type t = 0 then
dL
dc
|c=1+t=1 < 0⇒ {Lemma 6} ⇒
21−αg (1, t) <
W
α
⇒W > α
(
1
6
)α−1
= 6α
(
1
6
)α
Thus,
[
W − α ( 12 [t2 + 13])α−1] > 0 ∀t ∈ [0, 1] implying that ∆L increases in t. Q.E.D.
Lemma 28 Condition (iii) implies that ∆L increases in t.
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Proof: Follows directly from applying condition (iii) to t = 0 and using Lemma 27. Q.E.D.
Proposition 9 For any α ∈ ]0, α∗] there is a spider for any W at the range of values that satisfy conditions
(i)-(iii).
Proof: Lemma 25 and Condition (iii) imply that every type has a corner solution, either at c = 0 or at
c = 1 + t. Then, conditions (i) and (ii) and Lemma 28 imply that there exists a unique switching point at
the range [0, 1] such that types below it choose c = 0 while types above it choose c = 1 + t. Finally, Lemma
3 implies that dissent rate is increasing in t when t is below the switching point and then it abruptly falls to
0 at the switching point and stays there. Q.E.D.
D.3.5 Mildly strong concavity α ∈ ]α∗, 12[
Lemma 29 Suppose that g(c, t) has a local max point at some c ∈ [1− t, 1 + t]. Then c is strictly smaller
than 1.
Proof: A necessary condition for g(c, t) to have a local max point at c is that ∂g(c,t)∂c has a min point at
some c′ > c (because between 1− t and the max point g(c, t) is always increasing while after the max point
it starts decreasing). The value of c at the min point of ∂g(c,t)∂c at the range [1− t, 1 + t] is given by equation
(33). We will show that this value is smaller than 1. To show that, we need to show
1− 2α
2− 3α (1 + t) < 1⇔ ...
t <
1− α
1− 2α .
Lemma 18 implies that g(c, t) has a local max point only if t ≤ 14−6α . Noting that
1
4− 6α <
1− α
1− 2α ⇔ ...
⇔ 6α2 − 8α+ 3 > 0,
which can be verified to hold for all α, we indeed get that t ≤ 14−6α implies that t < 1−α1−2α , hence the local
max point is strictly smaller than 1. Q.E.D.
Lemma 30 Suppose that g(c, t) has a local max point at some cm ∈ [1− t, 1 + t]. Then the value of g(c, t)
at the local max point is strictly smaller than g (1 + t, t).
Proof: Lemma 18 implies that if g(c, t) has a local max point for some cm ∈ [1− t, 1 + t] then α ∈
[
1
3 ,
1
2
]
and t ∈
[
1−α
3−5α ,
1
4−6α
]
. So we focus on these values in the remainder of the proof. Lemma 29 further implies
that cm < 1. We will prove that the value of g(cm, t) < g (1, t). This is sufficient because, if this holds, then
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together with the fact that cm < 1 it implies that at the range c > 1 the function g(c, t) must be increasing40
and so g (1, t) < g (1 + t, t). Focusing on the range 1− t ≤ c < 1 + t, where (by equation (20))
g(c, t) = c
[(
−1
3
c+
1
2
t+
1
2
)
c2 +
1
6
(1− t)3
]α−1
,
let
(34) X(c;α, t) ≡ [g(c)] 1α−1 = c 1α−1
[
−1
3
c3 +
1
2
(t+ 1) c2 +
1
6
(1− t)3
]
be defined in the domain (α, t) which corresponds to α ∈ [ 13 , 12] and t ∈ [ 1−α3−5α , 14−6α]. Noting that
t =
1
4− 6α ⇒ α =
2
3
− 1
6t
t =
1− α
3− 5α ⇒ t =
2/5
3− 5α +
1
5
⇒ α = 3
5
− 2
25t− 5 ,
the domain can alternatively be described as t ∈ [ 12 , 1] and α ∈ [α1 (t) , α2 (t)], where α1 (t) = 23 − 16t and
α2 (t) =
3
5 − 225t−5 . We will show that X(c;α, t) has an inner min point exactly where g(c, t) has an inner
max point, and that X(c;α, t) at this min point is larger than X(1;α, t), which is equivalent to showing that
the value of g(c, t) at the inner max point of g(c, t) is smaller than g(1, t).41 Holding t constant, denoting
the value of c at the inner min point of X(c;α, t) by c0 (if it exists) and exploiting the fact that ∂X∂c = 0 at
this min point, we get
dX(c;α, t)
dα
| c=c0
t=const
=
∂X
∂c
∂c
∂α
+
∂X
∂α
=
∂X
∂α
> 0,
implying that X(c0;α, t) for given t reaches its minimum at α = α1 (t). Hence, given that X(1;α, t) is
independent of α, it is necessary and sufficient to show that X(c0;α, t) > X(1;α, t) for α = α1 (t).
The partial derivative ∂X(c;α,t)∂c is
∂X(c;α, t)
∂c
= −c
− 2−α1−α
1− α
{
c2
[(
2
3
− α
)
c+
(
α− 1
2
)
(1 + t)
]
+
1
6
(1− t)3
}
,
where the expression in the curly brackets is the one determining the sign of ∂g(c,t)∂c (see equation (30)), hence
the sign of ∂X(c;α,t)∂c is opposite to that of
∂g(c,t)
∂c , and so indeed X(c;α, t) has an inner min point exactly
where g(c, t) has an inner max point. Substituting α = α1 (t) into the expression for
∂X(c;α,t)
∂c and equating
40To see why it must be increasing, note that g has at most one inner local max point (this follows from
Lemma 15 since when there is one local min point of ∂g/∂c there can be at most two inner extrema where
only one is a max point). Thus, as cm is the only inner max point of g and g (cm, t) < g (1, t) then g must
be increasing at c = 1 and beyond.
41Since in the expression for X the power 1α−1 < 0.
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to zero to find a local min point we get(
2
3
− 2
3
+
1
6t
)
c3 +
(
2
3
− 1
6t
− 1
2
)
(1 + t) c2 +
1
6
(1− t)3 = 0⇔ ...
[c− (1− t)]
[
1
t
c2 − (1− t) c− (1− t)2
]
= 0,
whose roots in increasing order are
c1,2,3, =
1
2
t (1− t)
[
1−
√
1 +
4
t
]
, 1− t, 1
2
t (1− t)
[
1 +
√
1 +
4
t
]
.
It can be verified that at c2 = 1− t the sign of ∂g(c,t)∂c turns from positive to negative,42 hence this is a local
max point of g(c, t) and a local min point of X(c;α, t). Let us now substitute c = c2 back into X(c;α, t):
X(c = 1− t;α1 (t) , t) = 1
3
(1− t) 2−2t2t+1 (2t+ 1) .
We need to show that this is larger than
X(c = 1;α1 (t) , t) = −1
3
+
1
2
(t+ 1) +
1
6
(1− t)3 = 2 + 3t
2 − t3
6
.
Let
Y (t) ≡ 3 [X(1− t;α1 (t) , t)−X(1;α1 (t) , t)]
= (1− t) 2−2t2t+1 (2t+ 1)− 2 + 3t
2 − t3
2
.
Then the proof boils down to showing that Y (t) > 0 ∀t ∈ [ 12 , 1]. Define
y ≡ −2− 2t
2t+ 1
ln (1− t)
Then y ≥ 0 for t ∈ [ 12 , 1] and the Taylor-Lagrange formula for e−y implies that e−y ≥ 1− y. Hence
Y (t) ≥ Y1 (t) ≡ (2t+ 1)
[
1 +
2− 2t
2t+ 1
ln (1− t)
]
− 2 + 3t
2 − t3
2
= 2t+ 1 + 2 (1− t) ln (1− t)− 2 + 3t
2 − t3
2
.
42Plugging c = 1 − t and the value of α1 (t) into equation (31), which is the derivative of the expression
determining the sign of ∂g(c,t)∂c , yields
1
6t (1− t)2 [1− 2t], which is negative for t ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
, implying that the
sign of ∂g(c,t)∂c turns from positive to negative at c = 1− t.
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Let us now investigate Y1 (t). We have
Y ′1 (t) = −2 [1 + ln (1− t)]
Y ′′1 (t) =
2
1− t > 0,
and it can be verified that Y1 (1/2) < 0 while Y1 (5/9) > 0, which implies that Y1 (t) > 0 ∀t ≥ 5/9, implying
also that Y (t) > 0 ∀t ≥ 5/9. So the only thing left to show is that Y (t) > 0 ∀t ∈ [ 12 , 59]. In the interval
t ∈ [ 12 , 59] we have
Y (t) ≥ Y2 (t) ≡ (2t+ 1) (1− t)1/2 − 2 + 3t
2 − t3
2
Changing variables as follows: q ≡ √1− t, we get
Y2 (q) ≡ q
[
1 + 2
(
1− q2)]− 2 + 3 (1− q2)2 − (1− q2)3
2
= −2 + 3q + 3
2
q2 − 2q3 + q6
for q ∈
[
2/3,
√
1/2
]
. Now, we have Y2 (2/3) > 0 and Y ′2 (2/3) > 0, so it is sufficient to show that Y ′′2 (q) > 0.
Indeed,
Y ′′2 (q) = 3− 12q + 30q4 > 0 for q ∈
[
2/3,
√
1/2
]
,
because at the range q ∈
[
2/3,
√
1/2
]
we have
Y ′′′2 (q) = 12
(
10q3 − 1) ≥ 12(10(2
3
)3
− 1
)
> 0
and
Y ′′2
(
2
3
)
= 3− 12
(
2
3
)
+ 30
(
2
3
)4
> 0.
We have thus showed that Y2 (q) > 0 for q ∈
[
2/3,
√
1/2
]
and hence Y (q) > 0 for q ∈
[
2/3,
√
1/2
]
. Q.E.D.
Lemma 31 For any α ∈ ]α∗, 12[ and any t ∈ [0, 1], the loss function L (c) does not have a local min point
if W ≥ α21−αh (t)
Proof: Lemma 6 implies that the sign of dLdc is determined by the sign of 2
1−ααg(c, t) −W . Recalling
that limc→0 dLdc = ∞, this implies that L (c) may have a local min point only if there are at least two
different values of c ∈ ]0, 1 + t[ for which 21−ααg(c, t) = W . Turning now the focus to g(c, t), the fact that
limc→0 dLdc = ∞ implies further that 21−ααg(0, t) > W , while it is given that 21−ααh(t) ≤ W . We thus get
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that a necessary (though insufficient) condition for L (c) to have a local min point is for g(c, t) to have a local
max point in which its value exceeds that of h(t). This condition does not hold at the range c ∈ ]0, 1− t[
because g(c, t) does not have a local max point there (see Lemma 16), and it also does not hold at the range
c ∈ [1− t, 1 + t], because Lemma 30 states that the value of g(c, t) at the local max point, if it exists, is
strictly smaller than h (t). Q.E.D.
We will show the spider for the range ofW that satisfy the following conditions (where the inequalities
in I-III follow from Lemma 31):
(I) There exist types with a potential inner solution (i.e. local min point):
W < α21−αh (tmax)
(II) The type t = 0.34 does not have an inner solution:
α21−αh (0.34) ≤W
(III) The type t = 0 does not have an inner solution:
α21−αh (0) < W
(IV) The type t = 0 strictly prefers c = 1 + t over c = 0 which implies (by plugging the corner
options into equation (9)):
1
2
W >
(
1
2
[
t2 +
1
3
])α
W > 2 (1/6)
α
(V) There is no type t for whom g(c, t) has a local max point in which α21−αg(c, t) > W : Let
Wc ≡ α21−α max
t
{g(c, t)|c is local max of g(c, t)} .
Then we require W > Wc.
Lemma 32 For any α ∈ ]α∗, 12[ there exist a range of W that satisfy conditions (I)-(V)
Proof: Condition (I) sets an upper bound on W while the other four conditions set lower bounds, hence
we need to show that the intersections of condition (I) and each of the other conditions are not empty.
Conditions (I) and (II): Lemma 21 shows that tmax is weakly smaller than 1/3, hence h (tmax) > h (0.34).
Conditions (I) and (III): Lemma 19 establishes that tmax > 0, hence h(tmax) > h (0). Conditions (I) and
(IV): Lemma 23 implies that 2 (1/6)α < α21−αh (tmax) at the range α ∈
]
α∗, 12
[
. Conditions (I) and (V):
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Let tc be a type for whom Wc = α21−αg(c, t) at the local max point of g(c, t). Then Lemma 16 implies that
g(c, tc) reaches that local max point at some c ∈ [1− t, 1 + t], and from Lemma 30 we get that the value of
g(c, tc) at this local max point is strictly smaller than h(tc) ≤ h (tmax) hence Wc < α21−αh (tmax). Q.E.D.
Lemma 33 Let α ∈ ]α∗, 12[ and let W satisfy conditions (I-V). Then there exists a (non-singleton) neigh-
borhood of tmax s.t. types at this neighborhood are choosing an inner solution while any other type is choosing
c = 1 + t.
Proof: Lemma 31 implies that any t for whom W ≥ α21−αg (1 + t, t) has a corner solution to the mini-
mization problem, while condition (V) implies that any t for whom W < α21−αh (t) has at most one local
inner min point.43 Condition (IV) states that type t = 0 strictly prefers c = 1 + t over c = 0, and condition
(III) states that α21−αh (0) < W , hence dLdc |c=1+t < 0 for t = 0 (Lemma 6), which by Lemma 27 implies
that ∆L increases in t, hence all types prefer c = 1 + t over c = 0. Thus any type with a corner solution
chooses c = 1 + t, while all the types for whom W < α21−αh (t) (which by condition (I) contain more than
a singleton) choose their unique local min point as a solution because Lemma 6 implies that dLdc |c=1+t > 0
for these types hence c = 1 + t cannot be their global min point. Finally, Lemma 19 implies that h (t) has
a hill shape with a peak at tmax, hence the types for whom W < α21−αh (t) form a neighborhood around
tmax. Q.E.D.
Lemma 34 Let α ∈ ]α∗, 12[ and suppose condition (V) holds and some type t′ has an inner solution c (t′) ≤
1− t′. Then any t < t′ has an inner solution c (t′) ≤ 1− t′ too.
Proof: Lemma 6 implies that, in inner solutions, W = α21−αg (c (t′) , t′) . For any t < t′ we have (by
equation (20)) g (c, t) = g (c, t′) at the range c ∈ [0, 1− t′], hence W = α21−αg (c (t′) , t) where c (t′) ≤ 1− t′
implies that c (t′) < 1− t. In other words, t has a local min point of L at c (t′) as well. Condition (V) ensures
that this local min point is unique.44 Furthermore, at an inner solution, dLdc switches sign from negative to
positive, hence g (c, t) is increasing (by Lemma 6). Condition (V) ensures that this increasing part of g (c, t)
continues until c = 1 + t, implying that W < α21−αh (t) hence dLdc |c=1+t > 0 and so the local min point is
also the global min point. Q.E.D.
Proposition 10 For any α ∈ ]α∗, 12[ there is a spider for any W at the range of values that satisfy
conditions (I)-(IV)
Proof: Lemma 32 established that the conditions imply a non-empty set of W . Lemma 33 established
that there exists a non-singleton neighborhood of tmax where types have inner solutions, while types outside
43In inner solutions α21−αg (c, t) = W and g is increasing (so that α21−αg (c, t) crosses the W -line from
below). g (c, t) can be either U-shaped or double-U-shaped. In the latter case α21−αg (c, t) may cross the
W -line from below twice. Condition (V) ensures that such a crossing from below happens at most once.
44See proof of Lemma 33 for explanation.
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that neighborhood choose c = 1 + t, thus do not dissent. Condition (III) implies that type t = 0 is among
these latter types, and condition (II) implies the same for all types with t ≥ 0.34. Thus we know that the
neighborhood of tmax ⊂ [0, 1] . Since P = 0 for all types who do not dissent, to get the pattern of a spider
we need to verify that at the range of inner solutions the probability of dissent is either monotonic or first
increases and then decreases. First note that condition (III) implies that type t = 0 has no inner solution,
and so condition (V) and Lemma 34 imply that any type t in the range of types with inner solutions has a
solution at the range c ∈ [1− t, 1 + t] . In this range, we know from Lemma 4 that the probability of dissent
decreases if and only if dcdt > 1. Equation (25) gives us the expression of
dc
dt ,
dc
dt
= c
(1− α) [− 12 t2 + 12c2 + t− 12]
2
3c
3 − 16 t3 − 12 tc2 + 12 t2 − 12c2 − 12 t+ 16 + α (tc2 + c2 − c3)
,
where equation (26) implies that the numerator is positive. The denominator is the expression that determines
the sign of ∂g(c,t)∂c (by Lemma 7) at the range c ∈ [1− t, 1 + t], hence is positive too given that at an
inner solution dLdc switches signs from negative to positive, which by Lemma 6 implies that g (c, t) must be
increasing. It thus follows that dcdt > 0. Furthermore
dc
dt
> 1⇔ {as established in Lemma 12}
G = c2 [(3α− 1) c− (2α− 1) 3 (1 + t)]− (1− t)2 [(1− t) + (1− α) 3c] > 0.
To show the pattern of the spider it is thus sufficient to show that
dG
dt
=
∂G
∂t
+
∂G
∂c
dc
dt
≥ 0,
which, given that dcdt > 0, holds if both partial derivatives,
∂G
∂t and
∂G
∂c , are positive. Indeed,
∂G
∂t
= 3
[
(1− t)2 + 2 (1− α) c (1− t)− (2α− 1) c2
]
> 0
for α ≤ 1/2.
∂G
∂c
= 3
[
(3α− 1) c2 − 2 (2α− 1) (1 + t) c− (1− t)2 (1− α)
]
Fixing t and analyzing the behavior of ∂G∂c as a function of c, we get
∂2G
∂c2
= 6 [(3α− 1) c− (2α− 1) (1 + t)] = 0
⇒ c = (2α− 1) (1 + t)
(3α− 1)
If α ∈ [1/3, 1/2] then ∂G∂c is U-shaped with min point at c = (2α−1)(1+t)(3α−1) < 0 (i.e., outside the permissible
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range), implying that at the range c ∈ [1− t, 1 + t] it reaches its min at c = 1− t where it equals
∂G
∂c
= 3
[
(3α− 1) (1− t)2 − 2 (2α− 1) (1 + t) (1− t)− (1− t)2 (1− α)
]
= −12 (2α− 1) (1− t) t > 0
Alternatively, if α < 1/3, then ∂G∂c is hill-shaped and
c =
1− 2α
1− 3α (1 + t) > 1 + t
is a max point, implying again that at the range c ∈ [1− t, 1 + t] the function ∂G∂c reaches its min at c = 1− t
where it was just shown to be positive for any α < 1/2. Thus, for any α ∈ ]α∗, 12[, G is increasing, implying
that at the range of inner solutions the probability of dissent is either monotonic or first increases and then
decreases, as required for getting the pattern of a spider. Overall, we get a spider of the following kind: when
t goes from 0 to 1 the probability of dissent is first 0, then jumps to some strictly positive probability, then
it either increases or decreases, or first increases and then decreases, and finally the probability of dissent
decreases abruptly to 0 and stays there. Q.E.D.
D.4 The special case of α = 12
Proposition 11 Suppose α = 12 . Then there exists a non-empty set of W such that there is a spider
pattern.
Proof: We will prove a spider pattern of the following kind exists for some W : when t goes from 0 to 1
the probability of dissent is first 0, then jumps to some strictly positive probability, then it either increases
or decreases, or first increases and then decreases, and finally the probability of dissent decreases abruptly
to 0 and stays there. By equation (10) we have
dL
dc
= 2M
[
c
1
2
z−1/2 −W
]
,
and by 19
lim
c→0
dL
dc
=
√
2
2
−W .
Next, note that by (20)
g(c, t) =

[
1− 23c
]−1/2
> 0 if 0 < c < 1− t
c
[(− 13c+ 12 t+ 12) c2 + 16 (1− t)3]−1/2 if 1− t ≤ c < 1 + t
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∂g(c, t)
∂c
=

1
3
[
1− 23c
]−3/2 if 0 < c < 1− t
1
6
[
c3 + (1− t)3
] [
1
6 (1− t)3 − 13c3 + 12 tc2 + 12c2
]−3/2
if 1− t ≤ c < 1 + t
> 0
We know the expression is positive since
[
1
6 (1− t)3 − 13c3 + 12 tc2 + 12c2
]
= 2z ≥ 0 (since z by definition (8)
is a sum of two positive integrals). So g (c, t) increases everywhere. If W <
√
2
2 so that limc→0
dL
dc > 0, then
L(c) is always increasing in c (by Lemma 6 and since ∂g(c,t)∂c > 0) and so all types choose c = 0 hence dissent
rate is monotonically increasing – no spider. If W >
√
2
2 so that limc→0
dL
dc < 0, then L(c) is at least initially
decreasing and so all types have either a unique (by Lemma 6 and since ∂g(c,t)∂c > 0) inner solution or a
corner solution at c = 1 + t. Moreover, since g (c, t) increases everywhere, we know from Lemma 6 that type
t has an inner solution if and only if
h (t) = g(1 + t, t) >
W
21−αα
=
√
2W
Using h (t) = g(1 + t, t) = (1 + t)
(
1
3 + t
2
)−1/2 (see Lemma 9), we get
dh
dt
=
(
1
3
+ t2
)−1/2
− t(1 + t)
(
1
3
+ t2
)−3/2
= ...
=
(
1
3
− t
)(
1
3
+ t2
)−3/2
.
So h (t) is hill-shaped with a peak at tmax = 1/3, where it equals
4
3
(
4
9
)−1/2
= 2.
Thus, by setting W <
√
2 we can guarantee that at least types close to tmax have inner solutions. The
hill-shape of h (t) further implies that we can set W to be strictly greater than
max
{√
2
2
h (0) ,
√
2
2
h (1)
}
=
√
3/2
yet strictly smaller than
√
2, so that, by corollary 1, types close to 0 or to 1 choose c = 1 + t while there
exists a non-empty range of types in-between with inner solutions. To get the pattern of a spider we need
to verify that at the range of inner solutions the probability of dissent is either monotonic or first increases
and then decreases. As W has been set such that type t = 0 has no inner solution, Lemma 8 implies that
any type t in the range of types with inner solutions has a solution at the range c ∈ [1− t, 1 + t] . In this
range, we know from Lemma 4 that the probability of dissent decreases if and only if dcdt > 1. At the range
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c ∈ [1− t, 1 + t] (setting g (c, t) = 0 for inner solutions and applying the implicit function theorem) we have
dc
dt
= −
d
dtc
[− 13c3 − 16 t3 + 12 tc2 + 12 t2 + 12c2 − 12 t+ 16]−1/2
d
dcc
[− 13c3 − 16 t3 + 12 tc2 + 12 t2 + 12c2 − 12 t+ 16]−1/2
= −c −
1
2
[− 12 t2 + 12c2 + t− 12]
2
3c
3 − 16 t3 − 12 tc2 + 12 t2 − 12c2 − 12 t+ 16 + 12 (tc2 + c2 − c3)
.
This expression was shown before to be positive (from equation (26) we know the numerator is positive, and
the denominator is positive (by Lemma 7) because it has the sign of ∂g(c,t)∂c which is positive), hence
dc
dt ≥ 0,
implying the possibility of a spider.
The probability of dissent (P (t)) decreases in the range of types with inner solutions iff dcdt ≥ 1 (see
Lemma 4).
dc
dt
= c
1
2
[− 12 t2 + 12c2 + t− 12]
2
3c
3 − 16 t3 − 12 tc2 + 12 t2 − 12c2 − 12 t+ 16 + 12 (tc2 + c2 − c3)
≥ 1
⇔ c3 ≥ (1− t)2 [2 (1− t) + 3c]
Let
H(t, c) ≡ c3 − (1− t)2 [2 (1− t) + 3c] .
Then
∂H(t, c)
∂t
= 6 (1− t) [(1− t) + c] ≥ 0
and
∂H(t, c)
∂c
= 3
[
c2 − (1− t)2
]
≥ 0,
(since we established earlier in the proof that c > 1− t in inner solutions) and so
dH
dt
=
∂H
∂t
+
∂H
∂c
dc
dt
≥ 0,
implying that at the range of inner solutions the probability of dissent is either monotonic or first increases
and then decreases, as required for getting the pattern of a spider. Q.E.D.
92
E Proof of Proposition 3
Lemma 35 The functions α21−αh (tmax) and 1.8 (2/9)
α have one intersection point, denoted by α˜, at the
range α ∈ ]0, 12[. Furthermore we have
 α21−αh (tmax) < 1.8 (2/9)
α if α ∈ (0, α˜, )
α21−αh (tmax) > 1.8 (2/9)
α if α ∈ (α˜, 12)
Proof: Using h (t) as defined in Lemma 9 we get
α21−αh (tmax) = 1.8 (2/9)
α
⇔ α21−α (1 + tmax)
(
1
3
+ t2max
)α−1
=
9
5
(
2
9
)α
⇔ α(1 + tmax)
(
1
6
+
1
2
t2max
)α−1
=
2
5
(
2
9
)α−1
⇔ 5
2
(
3
4
+
9
4
t2max
)α−1
=
1
α(1 + tmax)
⇔ 5
2
(
3
4
+
9
4
t2max
)α
=
3
4
1 + 3t2max
α(1 + tmax)
⇔ 10
3
(
3
4
+
9
4
t2max
)α
=
1 + 3t2max
α(1 + tmax)
The RHS is the inverse of Ω (tmax (α) , α) which is defined in Lemma 22, where it is also shown to be increasing
in α, hence the RHS decreases in α.
Analyzing the LHS. Let
ξ (tmax (α) , α) ≡
(
3
4
+
9
4
t2max
)α
.
In Lemma 20 we showed that tmax increases in α. To show that ξ (tmax (α) , α) is increasing in α it is therefore
sufficient to show that the two partial derivatives of ξ (tmax (α) , α) with respect to its two arguments, tmax (α)
and α, are both positive.
∂ξ (tmax, α)
∂α
=
(
3
4
+
9
4
t2max
)α
ln
(
3
4
+
9
4
t2max
)
> 0
where the inequality follows since the smallest possible tmax is 23
√
2
√
3 − 1 (to see this recall that tmax
increases α and hence plug in α = 0 in equation 23) which implies 34 +
9
4 t
2
max > 1.
∂ξ (tmax, α)
∂tmax
= 4.5tmaxα
(
3
4
+
9
4
t2max
)α−1
> 0
Thus, the LHS increases in α while the RHS decreases in α, implying that there is a unique intersection
point α˜. To find which of the functions α21−αh(tmax) and 1.8 (2/9)
α is larger below and above α˜, we can
plug in specific values of α. When α = 0 the former function goes to 0 (recall that h is bounded) while the
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latter equals 1.8 hence is larger. When α −→ 12 we know from Lemma 21 that tmax approaches 13 hence the
former function approaches
1
2
21/2
4
3
(
4
9
)−1/2
=
4
3
(
9
8
)1/2
=
√
2
while the latter equals 1.8 (2/9)1/2 = 35
√
2 hence is smaller. This also implies α˜ ∈]0, 1/2[. The value of α˜ can
be numerically calculated to be ≈ 0.295. Q.E.D.
E.1 Proof of the propositionWe prove the proposition for t ≥ 0. Equivalent statements can be made
for t ≤ 0.
The average vote of type t, denoted by J (t) ≡ E [I(t)], is a weighted sum of her own type, with
probability Pm + P (t), and the median of the judges’ panel otherwise.
J (t) = [Pm + P (t)] t+
 tˆ
t−c
2vF (v) f (v) dv +
t+cˆ
t
2v (1− F (v)) f (v) dv

=
{
2F (t) [1− F (t)] + [F (t− c)]2 + [1− F (t+ c)]2
}
t+
tˆ
t−c
2vF (v) f (v) dv +
t+cˆ
t
2v (1− F (v)) f (v) dv
Let
Z ≡
tˆ
t−c
2vF (v) f (v) dv +
t+cˆ
t
2v (1− F (v)) f (v) dv
We analyze separately the three possible regions of c (for t ≥ 0):
c ≥ 1+ t
Z =
1
2
 tˆ
−1
v (1 + v) dv +
1ˆ
t
v (1− v) dv

=
1
2
 tˆ
−1
(
v + v2
)
dv +
1ˆ
t
(
v − v2) dv
 = ...
=
t3
3
(35) ⇒ J (t) = 1
2
(
1− t2) t+ t3
3
=
1
2
t− 1
6
t3
1− t ≤ c < 1+ t
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Z =
tˆ
t−c
v
1 + v
2
dv +
1ˆ
t
v
1− v
2
dv
=
1
2
 tˆ
t−c
(
v + v2
)
dv +
1ˆ
t
(
v − v2) dv
 = ...
=
t3
6
+
1
12
− 1
4
t2 +
1
2
ct− 1
4
c2 +
1
2
ct2 − 1
2
c2t+
1
6
c3
⇒ J (t) =
{
1
2
(
1− t2)+ [1
2
(1 + t− c)
]2}
t+
t3
6
+
1
12
− 1
4
t2 +
1
2
ct− 1
4
c2 +
1
2
ct2 − 1
2
c2t+
1
6
c3
= ... = t+
1
12
(1− t)3 + c2
(
1
6
c− 1
4
t− 1
4
)
c < 1− t
Z =
tˆ
t−c
2vF (v) f (v) dv +
t+cˆ
t
2v (1− F (v)) f (v) dv
=
1
2
 tˆ
t−c
(
v + v2
)
dv +
t+cˆ
t
(
v − v2) dv
 = ...
= tc (1− c)
⇒ J (t) =
{
1
2
(
1− t2)+ [1
2
(1 + t− c)
]2
+
[
1
2
(1− t− c)
]2}
t+ tc (1− c)(36)
= ... =
(
1− 1
2
c2
)
t
Note: the corner solution of c = 0 implies that the judge never signs v 6= t hence J(t) = t. The
corner solution of never dissenting (c = 1 + t) implies that the judge always votes according to the median
of the panel, which equals 12 t− 16 t3.
An equivalent statement of the proposition is that argmax(J (t)) /∈ {0, 1}. In Proposition 9 we
showed that, for α < α∗ (where 0.3 ≈ α∗ > α˜ ≈ 0.295), there exists a unique switching point at the range
[0, 1] such that types below it dissent whenever they are not the median of their panel (c = 0) while types
above it never dissent (c = 1 + t) under the conditions
W < 2 (1/6)
α(37)
(2/3)
α
< W(38)
α21−αh (tmax) < W(39)
(see (23) for a definition of tmax) and that these conditions hold for a non-empty set of W . This dissent
pattern implies (by (36) and (35)) that there exists some t¯ < 1 such that
J (t) =
 t for t ≤ t¯1
2 t− 16 t3 for t > t¯
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and hence (since t ≤ 1) that J (t) is first increasing for t ≤ t¯, then drops sharply at t¯, and finally increases
again for t > t¯. To show that argmax(J (t)) /∈ {0, 1} it is thus necessary and sufficient that
J (t¯) > J (1)⇔ t¯ < 1
3
,
hence that the type t = 1/3 prefers c = 0 over c = 1 + t:
L (c = 0; t = 1/3) < L (c = 1 + 1/3; t = 1/3)↔
using (7) with a uniform distribution, (9) and (12)
W
([
1 + t
2
]2
+
[
1− 1 + t
2
]2)
<
(
1
2
[
t2 +
1
3
])α
↔
W <
9
5
(
2
9
)α
.(40)
First we note that 95
(
2
9
)α
< 2 (1/6)
α for any α < α˜, hence we must show that condition (40) holds along
with conditions (38) and (39), i.e., that the set of W fulfilling the conditions is non-empty. Conditions (40)
and (38) yield a non-empty set if
(2/3)
α
<
9
5
(
2
9
)α
↔
α <
ln
(
5
9
)
ln
(
6
18
) ≈ 0.54,
which is fulfilled since α˜ ≈ 0.295. Conditions (40) and (39) hold together for any α < α˜ by Lemma 35.
F Proof of Proposition 4
We prove the proposition for t ≥ 0. Equivalent statements can be made for t ≤ 0. In Proposition
9 we showed that, for α < α∗ (where 0.3 ≈ α∗ > α˜ ≈ 0.295), there exists a unique switching point at the
range [0, 1] such that types below it dissent whenever they are not the median of their panel (c = 0) while
types above it never dissent (c = 1 + t) under a non-empty set of W .
Proof of part (i): When W = 0 the objective function for all types becomes minD which clearly is
achieved by dissenting whenever not being median (c = 0). Using (7) with a uniform distribution and c = 0
we get P (t) =
[
1+t
2
]2
+
[
1− 1+t2
]2
= t2 + 1 which clearly increases in t.
Proof of part (ii): The dissent pattern just described implies that t˜ = argmaxP (t) equals the largest
t that dissents when not being median. Since under these conditions the alternative is to never dissent, this
type must be indifferent between these two options: L
(
c = 0; t˜
)
= L
(
c = 1 + t˜; t˜
)
.Using (7) with a uniform
distribution together with (9) and (12) yields:
W
[1 + t˜
2
]2
+
[
1− 1 + t˜
2
]2 = (1
2
[
t˜2 +
1
3
])α
.
Solving for W it is easy to show that t˜ decreases in W if α < α˜ ≈ 0.295.
G The SCOTUS model
In this section we present a hierarchical model that is able to produce the spider-shaped pattern of
dissent rate as a function of ideological distance to SCOTUS and we derive the predictions that are presented
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in Proposition 5 and are tested empirically in Section 4. The hierarchical model presented here is developed
along the lines of the model of Beim et al. (2014).
Every period, three judges are randomly and independently drawn from a uniform distribution of
types t ∼ U (−1, 1) to sit together on a panel. The panel produces a binary verdict ("conservative" or
"liberal") for a case with characteristics x, where x ∼ (−1, 1). A judge of type t prefers a conservative
verdict over a liberal one iff x < t. The panel determines the verdict by a majority voting, implying that the
verdict is conservative if and only if the median judge, denoted tm, is such that x < tm.
A panel member may also dissent. Upon noticing a dissent, the Supreme Court may decide to
review the case. The bliss point of the Supreme Court is normalized to 0. Thus, the Supreme Court rules
conservatively on a reviewed case iff x < 0. The cost of dissenting is denoted W (and represents writing
costs of the minority opinion or collegial pressure). When a judge t is able to reverse the binary verdict in
case x her utility gain is |t − x|. Hence, a judge will never dissent if |t − x| ≤ W . We can calculate the
type-dependent probability of dissent P (t) while considering only a judge with t > 0 (by symmetry the same
applies to judges t < 0).
Under this framework, judge t > 0 may dissent in two scenarios:
1. tm > 0 and x ∈ [t, tm], so that both t and the Supreme Court prefer a liberal verdict while the panel
produces a conservative verdict.
2. tm < 0 and x ∈ [tm, 0], so that both t and the Supreme Court prefer a conservative verdict while the
panel produces a liberal verdict.
Under scenario 1, the judge indeed dissents if x− t > W , i.e., if x ∈ [t+W, tm]. Under scenario 2, the judge
indeed dissents if t − x > W , i.e., if x ∈ [tm,min {0, t−W}]. We will now show that the model produces a
spider-shaped pattern of dissent rate for W < 1/2. In this case, we have W < 1−W .
Figure A.13 is helpful in distinguishing between three regions of t.
Appendix Figure A.13.— Regions in SCOTUS model
A judge t in region I dissents if either x ∈ [t+W, tm] or x ∈ [tm, t−W ].
A judge t in region II dissents if either x ∈ [t+W, tm] or x ∈ [tm, 0].
A judge t in region III dissents if x ∈ [tm, 0].
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Calculating the type-dependent probability of dissent P (t), we get (each line represents one region
in the graph)
P (t) =

1
3
[
1
2 [1− (t+W )]
]3
+ 13
[
1
2 [(t−W )− (−1)]
]3 if t ∈ [0,W ]
1
3
[
1
2 [1− (t+W )]
]3
+ 13
(
1
2
)3 if t ∈ [W, 1−W ]
1
3
(
1
2
)3 if t ∈ [1−W, 1]
To understand the calculations of the expression of P (t), note first that the event x ∈ [tm, 0] is independent
of t and it occurs iff min t < tm < x < 0. As min t, tm and x are all drawn from a uniform distribution over
[−1, 1], the probability that all three of them are negative is ( 12)3, and the probability that x is the largest
among the three is 1/3, yielding the expression 13
(
1
2
)3. Next, the event x ∈ [tm, t−W ] is an adjustment
of this calculation for the event x ∈ [tm, t−W ]. In particular, we now need min t < tm < x < t −W , so
x needs to be the largest of the three uniformly-distributed variables, which all need to be in the region
[−1, t−W ], and this event corresponds to probability 13
[
1
2 [(t−W )− (−1)]
]3 (i.e., the probability of being
negative, 1/2, is replaced with the probability of being smaller than t −W , which is 12 [(t−W )− (−1)]).
Finally, the event x ∈ [t+W, tm] occurs iff t+W < x < tm < max t. So x needs to be the smallest of three
uniformly-distributed variables, which all need to be in the region [t+W, 1], and this event has probability
1
3
[
1
2 [1− (t+W )]
]3.
Differentiating with respect to t yields
dP (t)
dt
=

− 18 [1− (t+W )]2 + 18 [(t−W ) + 1]2 if t ∈ [0,W ]
− 18 [1− (t+W )]2 if t ∈ [W, 1−W ]
0 if t ∈ [1−W, 1]
It is immediate to see that dP (t)/dt is negative in region II. To get the sign of dP (t)/dt in region I, note
that t > 0 implies that t+W is closer to the right edge of the type distribution (1) than t−W is to the left
edge of the type distribution (−1), implying that
[1− (t+W )]2 < [(t−W ) + 1]2 ,
implying that dP (t)/dt > 0 in region I. Overall, we get that P (t) increases in region I and then decreases in
region II and stays flat in region III, implying a spider-shaped pattern of dissent rate.
G.1 Proof of Proposition 5 (i) When W = 0, regions I and III disappear and we are left only with
region II where dP (t)/dt is negative. Symmetry implies that for any type t, P (t) is decreasing in |t|.
(ii) The value of t for which P (t) is maximal is the border between regions I and II, i.e. t = W . It
is thus immediate that arg max
t
P (t) increases in W .
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